

รายงานวิจัยฉบับสมบูรณ์

บทบาทภาคประชาสังคมกับการสร้างสันติภาพในบริบทอาเซียน
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Roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding in ASEAN Context:
The Case Studies of Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand

ดร.ชายนีย์ ช. บุญพันธ์

ดร.นิวัติ สาหิม

โครงการวิจัยนี้ได้รับทุนสนับสนุนจากงบประมาณแผ่นดิน

มหาวิทยาลัยสงขลานครินทร์

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บทคัดย่อ

วัตถุประสงค์ของงานวิจัยชิ้นนี้เพื่อศึกษาการมีส่วนร่วมของภาคประชาสังคมในการสร้างสันติภาพในบริบทของอาเซียน ฟิลิปปินส์ มินดาเนา (ประเทศฟิลิปปินส์) อาเงาะห์ (ประเทศอินโดนีเซีย) และจังหวัดชายแดนใต้ประเทศไทย เพื่ออธิบายถึงบทบาทของภาคประชาสังคมในการสร้างสันติภาพในทั้งสามกรณีศึกษา และเพื่อหาแนวทางที่ประเทศต่าง ๆ ในอาเซียนจะสามารถร่วมมือกันโดยใช้ภาคประชาสังคมเป็นตัวเชื่อมในประชาคมการเมืองและความมั่นคงอาเซียน โดยในการวิจัยครั้งนี้ได้ประยุกต์ใช้กรอบแนวคิดบทบาทภาคประชาสังคมในการสร้างสันติภาพของ Paffenholz ในการศึกษาอันประกอบไปด้วย 7 บทบาท ได้แก่ การป้องกัน การติดตาม การสนับสนุน การขัดเกลาทางสังคม การติดต่อกันทางสังคม การอำนวยความสะดวก และการให้บริการต่าง ๆ การวิจัยครั้งนี้เป็นการวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพ โดยการสัมภาษณ์เชิงลึกตัวแทนจากภาคประชาสังคม จำนวน 23 คน และการสังเกตการณ์ร่วมด้วยการวิจัยเชิงเอกสาร

ผลการศึกษาพบว่ารัฐบาลควรให้ความสำคัญกับภาคประชาสังคมซึ่งถือว่ามีประโยชน์ต่อกระบวนการสร้างสันติภาพในทุกขั้นตอน บทบาทของภาคประชาสังคมในการให้การศึกษาเกี่ยวกับสันติภาพและการร่วมกันสร้างเครือข่ายล้วนมีส่วนสำคัญในการรักษาสันติภาพอย่างยั่งยืน รวมถึงการเปิดโอกาสให้เยาวชนมีส่วนร่วมในกระบวนการสร้างสันติภาพก็เป็นสิ่งจำเป็นในการสร้างความเข้มแข็งให้กับภาคประชาสังคม ดังนั้นประเทศในอาเซียนควรร่วมกันแบ่งปันความรู้และบทเรียนจากการแก้ปัญหาความขัดแย้งโดยผ่านช่องทางประชาคมการเมืองและความมั่นคงอาเซียน

คำสำคัญ: บทบาทประชาสังคม การสร้างสันติภาพ บริบทของอาเซียน มินดาเนา อาเงาะห์
ชายแดนใต้ประเทศไทย

Abstract

The purposes of this study were to find out what civil society can contribute to peacebuilding in ASEAN context - Mindanao (the Philippines), Aceh (Indonesia), and southernmost Thailand; to study roles of civil society in building peace in the three case studies; and to study how countries in ASEAN could cooperate in the pillar of ASEAN Political-Security Community by using civil society as a tool. This study applied the Paffenholz's framework of civil society role in peacebuilding including 7 roles: Protection, Monitoring, Advocacy, Socialization, Social Cohesion, Facilitation, and Service Delivery. A qualitative method was used in this research. It employed in-depth interview 23 respondents from civil society sector and observation technique together with documentary research.

The study found that: Government should aware of the importance of civil society sector that be advantageous in every stage of peacebuilding process. Roles of civil society in peace education and building networks are important for keeping sustainable peace. Moreover, getting participation from the young generation in peacebuilding process is also required in order to strengthen civil society sector. Thus, ASEAN members should share knowledge or lesson learned from conflict resolution by using ASEAN Political-Security Community as a channel.

Keyword: Roles of Civil Society, Peacebuilding, ASEAN contexts, Mindanao, Aceh, Southernmost Thailand.

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Abbreviations

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippine
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
BOL	Bangsamoro Organic Law
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional
BRR	Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias)
CBCP	Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines
CBOs	Community-based Organizations
CFA	Catholic Foundation of Asia
CFP/CfP	Coalition for Peace
CMI	Crisis Management Initiatives
CODE-NGO	Caucus of Development NGO Networks
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
ConCom	Constitutional Convention
CPC	Civilian Protection Component
CPD	Council for People's Development
CPE	Center for Peace Education
CPLA	Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
DLSU	De La Salle University
DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operation Zone)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DSCC	Deep South Coordination Center
DSRR	Deep South Relief and Reconciliation Foundation
DSW	Deep South Watch
FAB	Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
FLAG	Free Legal Assistance Group

GABRIELA	General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GONGOS	government non-governmental organizations
GZOPI	Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute
HDC	Henry Dunant Centre
HOPE	Hearts of Peace
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ISOC	Internal Security Operations Command
KMU	Kilusang Mayo Uno
LLAF	Lean L. Alejandro Foundation
LoGA	Law of Governing Aceh
MCC	Mennonites Central Committee
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberations Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPD	Movement for the Popular Democracy
MSN	Mindanao Solidarity Network
MSPA	Multisectoral Peace Advocates
MSU	Mindanao State University
NASSA	National Secretariat for Social Action
NCCP	National Council of Churches in the Philippines
NCR	National Capital Region
NCRFW	National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDU	Notre Dame University
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NPA	New People's Army
NPC	National Peace Conference
NSAs	Non-state Actors

NUC	National Unification Commission
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OPC	Office of the Peace Commissioner
PN	Peace Net
POs	People's Organizations
PRRM	Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
PSCs	Public Service Contractors
PSIPhil	Peace Studies Institute, Philippines
PsPN	Paghiliusa sa Paghidaet Negros
RPMM	Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Mindanaw (Revolutionary Workers' Party of Mindanao)
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VOs	Volunteer Organizations
WCC	World Council of Churches

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Significance of the Problem

Political security and stability is one of the most important factors to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the Southeast Asian region. That is why APSC pillar or ASEAN Political-Security Community has been included as one of the three main components of ASEAN Community. APSC is very important as it is an ASEAN body to resolve conflict and promote peace in the region.

Most countries in Southeast Asia have faced difficulties after gaining independence. In the Philippines, the decades old conflict in Muslim Mindanao, which had held out some hope for resolution with the signing of the 1996 peace agreement between the Philippines government and the largest Muslim rebel group, the Moro National Liberation Front, flared up once again in the late 1990s mainly as a result of the government's failure to keep their promise on economic assistance and development for Mindanao. In the case of Indonesia, one of the most widespread issues of contemporary ethnic politics is related to the attempt by the state to deal politically and economically with the grievances of Muslims and the communities on the other islands who perceive themselves as second-class citizens who have been left out by the state's distribution of wealth (Brown, 1994). The violence in southernmost Thailand is one of the most prolonged ethno-religious conflicts in Southeast Asia. Although the conflict in the deep south of Thailand does not catch the attention as much as other cases in the region, almost every day innocent people have been killed or injured since the upsurge in the insurgency in 2004. Overall, internal security and insurgency issues remain a challenge for Southeast Asian countries. These regions remain threatened by ethno-religious separatist insurgencies that have been fighting for their autonomy or their rights, although there is a huge effort to develop peaceful coexistence, and constructive economic and political collaboration.

It has been said that in contemporary wars, both state and non-state actors have played important roles in resolving the conflict. Where states had failed, or took part in

conflicting violence, civil society actors were seen as a necessary party for conflict resolution. Moreover, the aim of international diplomacy is no longer only to settle disputes, but also to prevent future conflict through transforming and democratizing societies. This is impossible without involving those that have been marginalized in the conflict. This results in increasing recognition for civil society in building peace in the conflict. Indeed, it is suggested that civil society should participate in formal peace processes. Consequently, some peace strategies have been developed to enhance the participation of civil society in solving conflicts (Leeuwen, 2009).

The Paffenholz's framework (2010) of role of civil society was applied into over ten case studies but none of them are in ASEAN countries. This is why the researchers are interested in applying this framework into the cases of Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. The research results will be useful for policy implication because they can focus and encourage towards the most relevant functions of civil society. Learning from the countries that have similar conflicting context (e.g. Indonesia and Philippines) will help to support what the Thai civil society groups can contribute to the peacebuilding process. Thailand and other countries can learn the important factors that can support or reduce the ability and potential of civil society sector. The examples of the said factors are the behavior of the state, the level of violence, the freedom of the media, the diversity within civil society sector and the role of donor engagement.

The conflict situation in *Mindanao* is quite complex. To understand the effect of civil society's efforts to end the long-running separatist war, clarifying its context is required. It must be remembered that violent conflict in the southern Philippines is not only as a result of the Muslim-Christian communal problems or Islamic separatist insurgencies. There is banditry, focusing on kidnapping, a communist insurgency, and endemic tribal conflict. All these variables affect efforts to resolve this separatist insurgency (Rood, 2005). Civil society groups in Mindanao have showed their interest in peacebuilding efforts since the ensuing armed war in Mindanao in the 1970s. It was considered that civil society groups in Mindanao could contribute significantly in terms of managing the conflict and ultimately achieving lasting peace in Mindanao. Encouraging the locals to establish spaces for peace, where combatants are requested not to be in

a particular community, was one of the successful activities supported by the civil society. Moreover, the civil society groups help the government to move toward peace by promoting interreligious dialogue and involvement of civil society in the official peace process. They also help to reduce the level of conflict by pushing for a restoration of the ceasefire.

According to the Philippines EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society 2014 – 2017 (EU Heads of Mission, 2004), civil society is an essential part that can contribute to the peacebuilding process. The EU promotes dialogue with CSOs as civil society essential to the development of the new Bangsamoro. A dialogue would be beneficial for both: the EU would get relevant information and a sense on the developments at grassroots level and could provide support in strengthening comprehensive and objective dialogue between government and the people. Additionally, the civil society will be supported in fostering mediation, interfaith dialogue, conflict resolution, human rights and promoting better democratization process. EU will also facilitate civil society's active participation in the elections in Bangsamoro, and where applicable.

Peacebuilding is a relatively new role for civil society in *Aceh* compared to other activities such as human rights advocacy, community development and economic development. However, civil society organizations have become actively involved in the peace process in *Aceh*. Afridal (2008) describes how civil society organizations assisted in monitoring security during the 'Humanitarian Pause', agreed between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 2000. As peacemaking efforts developed, civil society organizations were involved in explaining them to the population, and in helping to allay local skepticism of international mediation. Furthermore, civil society organizations facilitated public engagement in the drafting of the Law on the Governing of Aceh after the 2005 peace settlement had been reached. But inexperience meant that civil society organizations were vulnerable to manipulation by the parties, and some became targets of violence.

However, *Acehnese* civil society did not have much experiences and knowledge in conflict management to engage in the peace process. As a result, some civil society organizations were seen as a tool for the conflicting parties to play their political games.

This created negative perceptions among civil society organization members, and among less experienced individuals, frustration with slow progress in the peace process occasionally resulted in radicalization and regression to militaristic approaches. There is also a lack of records of these experiences. It is a source of concern that so many invaluable experiences and lessons might be diminished one day because they have not been adequately documented and recorded.

Some civil society organizations believed that their engagement in the peace process in Aceh resulted in its receiving strong international support. Some even believed that international civil society organizations involvement was the result of committed campaigning on Aceh's issues in various international forums. Internally, involvement in the peace process offered substantial experience and many lessons which will certainly be useful in the future. Some Acehnese civil society organizations were entrusted with providing expertise and know-how for peace processes in other countries by sharing their experiences and lessons learned.

However, there were also significant negative impacts on civil society. These included pressure and even violence towards civil society organizations who were involved in peace process. Some civil society groups became targets of violence ranging from threats to murder. These developments were considered by individuals within Acehnese civil society as intrinsic risks deriving from their own choice to be engaged in peacebuilding in the midst of armed conflict.

Ethno-religious conflict in the *southernmost provinces of Thailand* has a long historical background. Many factors and variables influence the tension between the conflicting parties. In the case of southern Thailand, ethnic tension has been latent in this sensitive area for centuries. Education and social activities were tools which would help to prevent the conflict before it erupted (Boonpunth, 2014). Unfortunately, the Thai government during that time ignored this unbalanced power situation and kept repeating the national policies that emphasized inequality in the society. When injustice and unbalanced power had accumulated to a certain level, along with some incidents as triggers, violence finally erupted and thus the conflict was no longer hidden. Awareness of the conflict became high and confrontation among conflicting parties was unavoidable.

The stability of Thai politics is considered low and there are always short-term governments. The government has put a lot of effort, manpower and money into trying to stop the violent situation in the deep south which has been ongoing for over a decade. Unfortunately, the solution for the conflict remains difficult to find. However, civil society's involvement and public participation are the options which have become more active and important in southern Thailand. The status of the civil society sector dealing with the conflict in the deep south of Thailand has the potential to grow as it has a number of strong internal factors and many opportunities that can increase capabilities and help the groups to perform better (Boonpunth, 2014).

As it was underlined, negotiations alone between the conflicting parties are not enough to end the conflict permanently; other relevant actors have to be included in the peace process such as civil society groups, scholars, the mass media, community leaders and local people. The state, as a peacekeeper, can only stop using weapons and reduce the violence by formal agreement; however, the prolonged conflict remains in the community. The violence could escalate anytime even though an official ceasefire was agreed because the root causes (i.e. poverty, feeling discriminated and lack of trust in the rule of law) have not yet been resolved. In the future, trends in the civil society sector attempting to build peace will be varied depending on internal and external factors.

1.2 Research Questions

1.2.1 Which roles of civil society sector in ASEAN countries, the Philippines Indonesia and Thailand, are the most active and effective in peacebuilding process?

1.2.2 What are the advantages and difficulties of having civil society's activities in peacebuilding process?

1.3 Purposes of the Study

1.3.1 To study how civil society can contribute to peacebuilding in ASEAN context; the Philippines Indonesia and Thailand.

1.3.2 To explain roles of civil society in building peace in ASEAN countries - the Philippines Indonesia and Thailand.

1.3.3 To seek how countries in ASEAN could cooperate in the pillar of ASEAN Political-Security Community by using civil society as a tool.

1.4 Scope of the Study

1.4.1 Scope of area: the Philippines (Mindanao), Indonesia (Aceh), and Thailand (Southernmost provinces)

1.4.2 Scope of population and samples: civil society groups in the Philippines Indonesia and Thailand

1.4.3 Scope of contents: roles of civil society in peacebuilding in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand

1.4.4 Scope of timeframe: 2 years and 6 months from 1 October 2017 to 30 March 2020

1.5 Research Methodology

A qualitative method was used in this research because it is concerned with analyzing meanings and experiences rather than expressing numbers or statistical findings. This qualitative method employs in-depth interview with open-ended questions and observation technique together with documentary research.

1.6 Definitions

1.6.1 *Ethnic conflict* means a violent conflict between ethnic groups or between an ethnic group and government forces. Ethnic groups can be challenged over matters such as autonomy, language rights, education, religion, national symbols and political representation. The ethnic conflicts in this study represent the case studies in Mindanao, the Philippines; Aceh, Indonesia; and the southernmost provinces of Thailand.

1.6.2 *Southernmost provinces of Thailand* mean the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and four districts (i.e. Saba Yoi, Thepa, Chana and Na Thawi) of Songkhla province.

1.6.3 *Civil society* means non-profit voluntary groups working for the same purpose and interest. The groups may be formed by members who have the same motherlands, cultural beliefs, religious affiliations, and occupations. The groups could be initiated and/or supported by local people, the state, or private sectors.

1.6.4 *Peacebuilding* means the strategy which is not only a matter of control and reduction of the use of arms or violence, but also referred to as development and social healing. It aims for not only a limitation of physical violence but sustainable peace in a long term.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

This chapter describes the theories and definitions of ethnic conflict, civil society and peacebuilding. This chapter is divided into four important sectors: 1) definition of ethnic conflict; 2) concepts of civil society; 3) concepts of peacebuilding; and 4) the links between ethnic conflict, civil society and peacebuilding.

2.1 Definition of Ethnic Conflict

First of all, let define the term 'ethnicity' which most scholars agree is 'that part of a person's identity which is drawn from one or more markers like race, religion, shared history, place, social symbols or language'. An ethnic group, therefore, 'is a group of people bound together by a belief about common kinship and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, language, and history' (Jesse & Williams, 2011: 5).

Tolerance between ethnic groups can be challenged over matters such as autonomy, language rights, education, religion, national symbols and political representation, however, most ethnic groups strive for rights and progress without violent means. Most ethnic conflicts are conducted through political institutions and channels. Violence, however, can become a factor when struggles or competition between ethnic groups are repositioned outside the political arena.

According to Smith (cited in Brown, 1993: 4) in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, an 'ethnic community' is 'a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity'. Six criterias must be met before a group can be called an ethnic community. First, the group must have a name for itself. A lack of a name reflects an insufficiently developed collective identity. Second, the people in the group must believe in a common ancestry. This is more important than genetic ties, which may exist, but are not essential. Third, the members of the group must share historical memories, often myths or legends passed from generation to generation by word of mouth. Fourth, the group must have a shared culture, generally based on a combination of language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts, architecture, even food. Fifth, the group must feel an attachment to a specific territory,

which it may or may not actually inhabit. Sixth, the people in a group have to think of themselves as a group in order to constitute an ethnic community; that means they must have a sense of their common ethnicity.

Assefa's (1996) commonly used definition of an ethnic group is that it is a collectivity of people who share the same primary characteristics such as ancestry, language, culture and religion. Ethnicity then, refers to the behavior and feeling about oneself and others that supposedly emanates from membership of an ethnic group. Finally, ethnic conflict has come to mean cleavages between groups based on differentiations in ethnic identities.

According to Byman (cited in Williams, 2011: 7), 'An ethnic conflict is a violent conflict between ethnic groups or between an ethnic group and government forces that consists of one or more different ethnic groups'. He also added there are two main types of conflict: group versus group conflict, with the government acting as a third party of some kind and group versus government conflict, where the government is an active party acting on behalf of one ethnic group.

2.2 Concepts of Civil Society

2.2.1 Definitions of Civil Society

There is no commonly agreed definition of the term civil society beyond the basic idea of civil society being an arena of voluntary, non-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values (Paffenholz, 2010).

Today, civil society is commonly described as 'a sphere of voluntary collective activity encompassing shared interests, purpose, and values of civility. This sphere is furthermore distinguished from state, market, and family institutions. These boundaries are, however, blurred, complex and negotiated in reality as civil society covers a wide range of spaces, actors and institutional forms'. Some of the functions of civil society that Woodward (1994: 226) noted are: to create a sphere of autonomous social activity, to campaign and agitate on behalf of political and social objectives, to provide a counterweight to governmental power, and to oppose the illegitimate exercise of governmental power.

Finally, since the growth of civil society has been one of the most important issues in international development, a definition of civil society by the World Bank has

been added. This is because it is an international organization which has interacted with state development and civil society since the 1970s. Civil society organizations (CSOs) refers 'to non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethnic, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. This includes a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations' (Fischer, 2006: 4).

2.2.2 Position of Civil Society

It is also important to clarify where civil society is placed in the community. According to civil society concepts and theories raised by various scholars, the civil society sector has been positioned differently and plays diverse roles according to political and cultural norms.

The first concept which was mentioned by Paffenholz considered civil society as a separate sector consisting of a variety of mainly voluntary organizations that have different objectives, interests and ideologies. Civil society is seen as different from the political, the business, as well as the private sectors as it is a non-state actor that is not purely driven by private or economic interests. Therefore, the civil society sphere is formally and legally independent from the spheres of the state, economy and family. However, the civil society sector interacts closely with these other sectors, especially the state/political sector, as civil society makes political demands toward the state agencies (see figure 2.1). Although civil society interacts with these sectors, it does not replace these actors, but rather aims to improve their effectiveness and responsiveness (Croissant, 2003 in Paffenholz, 2010).




Figure 2.1 - Civil Society as a Sector

Source: Paffenholz, 2010: 7.

Some of the research agreed that specific actors in general contributed to specific sector areas, but occasionally can also act as civil society. This concept characterizes civil society as the space between the sectors. Therefore, civil society is the public realm between state, economy and family sectors (see figure 2.2).

According to the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, civil society can be defined as (Nikolov & Semcesen, 2008: 7) ‘the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests’. Additionally, it can be said that neither civil society nor the different sectors of society are isolated phenomena (see figure 2.3).




Figure 2.2 - Civil Society as an Intermediate Sphere

Source: Paffenholz, 2010: 7.




Figure 2.3 - Civil Society as an Overlapping Sphere within the Sectors

Source: Nikolov & Semcesen, 2008: 7.

2.2.3 Types of Peace Civil Society

David Korten's classification (1990 in Ferrer, 1997) of four generations of NGOs in the global development network is widely appreciated for providing the evolutionary context of the global social development agenda and responses. Korten identified four types of NGOs are as follows:

- Public Service Contractors (PSCs) which function as market-oriented nonprofit businesses serving public purposes and contracted to implement programs of donors;
- The Volunteer Organizations (VOs) which pursue a social mission driven by a commitment to shared values;
- People's Organizations (POs) which represent their members' interest, have member-accountable leaderships and are substantially self-reliant; and
- Government Non-governmental Organizations (GONGOs) which are private entities created by government/government officials and serve as instruments of government policy.

However, Korten refers to four sectors involved in the development process. These are government, private business (which includes the PSCs), the NGOs, and what he calls the fourth sector, a new feature that lends a popular flavor to contemporary development processes, the POs. Here, a confusion arises because in this second categorization, the POs is made a distinct sector from the NGOs whereas, in the first categorization, the POs is one kind of NGOs.

In consonance with the second categorization, Korten distinguishes between third-party and first-party organizations. Third-party organizations are 'those basing their social legitimacy on the basis that they exist to serve the needs of third parties - persons who are not themselves members of the organization.' They include government, business and voluntary organizations (a subset of the NGOs). On the other hand, the POs (a subset of the NGOs in the first categorization but a distinct sector from the NGO sector in the second categorization) is a first party organization. Being in the nature of a mutual benefit association, their purpose is to advance the interest of their members (Ferrer, 1997).

2.3 Concepts of Peacebuilding

2.3.1 Peace-building Model

Ryan (1990) has combined the peace strategies introduced by Johan Galtung, and developed by Michael Harbottle, and has added another tripartite system suggested by Christopher Mitchell (see figure 2.4).

Problem to be addressed	Strategy	Target Group
Violent behavior	Peace-keeping (military activity)	Armed groups (warriors)
Perceived incompatibility of interests	Peace-making (political activity)	Decision-makers (leaders)
Negative attitudes and socio-economic structures	Peace-building (socio-economic activity)	Ordinary people (followers)

Figure 2.4 - A Framework for Conflict Resolution

Source: Ryan, 1990: 52.

i. Peace-keeping and the reduction of violent behavior

Peace-keeping is an activity which involves the interposition of government security forces and militant groups either to stop violence or to prevent it. The public will tend to be less committed to such a course of action, and will tend to share or reject such values as the general intercommunal situation and the activities of the warriors' changes. When ethnic groups are engaged in a violent conflict, peace-keeping is often the most urgent and necessary of all peace strategies for it is the only one which deals directly with the armed groups on all sides who are engaged in mutual destruction.

ii. Peace-making and the reduction of conflicting interests

Peace-making is concerned with the search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties. There are a few approaches which the conflicting parties can try to deal with the conflicts such as through power and through the law. However, these approaches may be effective only for a short

term. As these root causes are left unresolved, the conflict will simply be suppressed and will re-emerge in the future.

iii. Peace-building and the reduction of negative attitudes

Peace-building is the strategy which most directly tries to reverse the destructive processes that accompany violence. This involves a shift of focus away from the armed conflict, with whom peace-keepers are mainly concerned, to the attitudes and socio-economic circumstances of ordinary people. Therefore, it tends to concentrate on the context of the conflict rather than on the issues which divide the parties. All peace-building strategies involve greater inter-party contact. So whereas peace-keeping is about building barriers between the armed parties, peace-building tries to build bridges between local people in communities.

2.3.2 Phases of Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding was seen as the third phase of the conflict resolution process, following the enforced cessation of violence (peacekeeping) and the negotiation of a settlement agreement (peacemaking). In fact, peacebuilding is recognized as dynamic having something to contribute in every phase of a conflict and always moving in response to the situation and the stage of the peacemaking efforts (Gawerc, 2006). Although most peacebuilding happens once conflict has ended, some peacebuilding tasks can start even during conflict.

There are three phases of peacebuilding (World Bank, 2006). First, pre-conflict peacebuilding aims at preventing the start of violent conflict. The second phase is peacebuilding during armed conflict or conflict management. This phase aims to end armed conflict and to reach a peace agreement. Even though the concept of peacebuilding includes interventions at the stages before and during the conflict, most peacebuilding activities concentrate on the post-conflict stage. Many peacebuilding scholars, however, advocate an increased focus on pre-conflict peacebuilding in the future. The last phase, and the most important, is the post-conflict phase which is the stage after the end of large scale violence. Many researchers found that there is a high risk of reverting to large scale violence within the first five years after the end of war.

Furthermore, post-conflict peacebuilding has been divided into three dimensions: stabilizing the post-conflict zone, restoring state institutions, and dealing with social and economic issues. The first dimension aims to reinforce state stability after the armed conflict and discourage former combatants from returning to war through activities such as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration programs, security sector reform, and arms control for light and heavy weapons systems. The second dimension activities focus on building state capacity to provide basic public goods and increase state legitimacy. Finally, programs in the third dimension are to build a post-conflict society's ability to manage conflicts peacefully and to promote socioeconomic infrastructure development. The main focus of post-conflict research is the durability of peace agreements including how peace agreements can be successfully implemented in the immediate aftermath of wars and sustained thereafter (Barnett, 2007).

2.3.3 Actors in Peacebuilding

Lederach (1997) found it helpful to think of leadership in the population affected by a conflict as being in terms of a pyramid. The pyramid can be used as a way of describing the numbers within a population in simplified terms. The pinnacle, or top level leadership, represents the fewest people. The base of the pyramid represents the largest number of people; the grassroots. The pyramid also shows the types of leaders, the sectors from which they come at each level and the conflict transformation activities that the leaders at each level may undertake.

Level 1: Top Level Leadership

The top level leadership comprises of the key political and military leaders in the conflict. These people are the highest representative leaders of the government and opposition movements. A great deal of attention is paid to their movements, statements, and positions. These highly visible leaders are generally locked into positions taken with regard to the perspectives and issues in conflict. They are under considerable pressure to maintain a position of strength against their adversaries and in their own constituencies.

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership

Middle-range leaders are persons who function in leadership positions within the setting of a conflict, but whose positions are not necessarily connected to or controlled by the government or opposition groups.

Middle-range leadership can be described in several different ways. One approach is to focus on persons who are highly respected as individuals and/or occupy formal positions of leadership in sectors such as education, business, agriculture, or health. A second approach is to consider the primary networks of groups and institutions that may exist within a conflict area, such as religious groups, academic institutions, or humanitarian organizations. A third approach is to concentrate on the identity groups in conflict, and to locate middle-range leaders among people who are well known as belonging to a minority ethnic group, or who are from a particular geographic region within the conflict and are respected by the people of that region, but are also known outside the region. The final approach is to focus on people from within the conflict setting but whose prestige extends much farther.

The key actors within this level have significant features: they have contact with top level leaders, but are not influenced by the elite level, and their position is not based on political or military power. Similarly, they have experience of people living at the grassroots level but they are not struggling with the survival demands that the violence affected victims face. They have good connections with both the top and the grassroots levels.

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership

The grassroots represent the masses, the base of the society. In some cases, people at this level are involved in an effort to survive and keep their lives safe. The leadership at the grassroots level also operates on a day-to-day basis. Leaders in this level include people who are involved in local communities, members of indigenous non-governmental organizations carrying out relief projects for local people, health officials, and refugee camp leaders. These people understand intimately the fear and suffering of the local people; they also have an expert knowledge of local politics and know on a face to face basis the local leaders of the government and its adversaries.

To understand how important of civil society's role in building peace, it is a good idea to understand the Lederach's pyramid of actors in peacebuilding. The pyramid shows the middle-range leadership can affect the large amount of people while the grassroots is the base of the community. Leaders in civil society groups are considered as in middle-range and grassroots leadership.

2.3.4 Role of Development in Peacebuilding

To what extent are the internal armed conflicts spurred by economic deprivation so much so that economic incentives would enhance the option of accommodation under the existing regime and within the current nation state framework? (Ferrer, 2013).

In many ethnic mobilizations, oppression in economic terms emerges as an important source of discontent and corresponding mobilizing platform. Some texts would even consider it as the 'bottom line', even more important than the political and/or cultural dimensions of the problem. This has in turn led to the economic perception that once economic development takes place, political mobilization is dissipated. However, this is not necessarily true in all cases.

The promise of development has weighed heavily on government responses to ethnic mobilization. For one, it has the advantage of transcending or being delinked from the political or ideological quest for autonomy or separatism. The latter are problematic since they require constitutional mechanisms that the present state format may not possess or which the political leadership, in their defense of national sovereignty and/or established political interests, may not be willing to grant. The promise of economic development also generates the support of the more pragmatic sections of the populace whose main concern is economic opportunities or survival. Local governments and other leadership sectors, including those of the separatist group, also find the infusion of development funds an attractive proposition.

The development proposition has played a moderating influence on armed mobilization in Southern Philippines. Indeed, even as the end of the Cold War saw fertile ground for ethnic mobilization, the reverse-demobilization or deradicalization – has also taken place. This development seems to move with the observations that economic pragmatism has given way to ideology, and that the post-Cold War period has also witnessed the peaceful settlement of long-standing conflicts. The 1996 Peace

Agreement between the Philippines government and MNLF, for instance, effectively ended armed conflict between the two parties.

The following paradigm highlights the importance of a comprehensive approach to peace, especially in trying to address legitimate/ root causes. In this paradigm, socioeconomic development is found as one infrastructure needed to achieve sustainable peace. This is in recognition of the role of poverty and economic disparities in fueling conflicts. Through socioeconomic development, employment is generated and national wealth is increased. Equitable development further ensures a more even distribution of wealth. These, in turn, diminish the discontent that provides fertile ground for rebel recruitment and activity. Economic development also enhances legitimacy of the political leadership, making for more stable governance (See Figure 2.5).




Figure 2.5 - Necessary Condition for Sustainable Peacebuilding

Source: Reyhler and Langer in Ferrer, 2013

The Peace Proposition: The Role of Peace in Development

Although development- especially equitable and sustainable development – creates favorable conditions to achieve peace, development cannot be sustained in a situation of persistent intermittent conflict. Conflagration results in the destruction and/or dispersal of population, efforts, and resources. Development on the other hand, requires continuity and security of capital and human resources. For this reason, war is inconsistent with or counterproductive to development objectives.

Moreover, military approaches to settle insurgencies have tended to exacerbate the situation, creating a most common phenomenon described in peace studies as the ‘spiral of violence’. Military offensives come with militarization of communities, given that many armed challenges are in the nature of guerrilla warfare. The resultant human rights violations and injustices further drive people to violent action, which in turn invites greater military repression. A war of attrition ensues, and the origin of the conflict is blurred by acts of reprisals by all sides. The conflict assumes a prolonged and devastating character, giving rise to the high costs of war.

Thus, negative peace becomes necessary to provide a favorable context for development and more thorough social transformation. Simply put, negative peace pertains to the absence of war and other direct violence or actual hostilities. Negative peace creates the conditions for positive peace; both complement each other. Moreover, negative peace puts a break to the patterns that support war and earn war benefits for those who exploit the conditions of war. Not surprisingly, there is much resistance to negative peace from the groups who benefit most from its absence. Policies should therefore move from those that urge violence to those that focus more on peace and development.

The term ‘peace dividends’ reflects the results from achieving negative peace. Expenditures and losses due to wars can be converted into peace dividends derived from savings of resources otherwise used in war efforts and earnings otherwise lost because of the conflict. But beyond monetary accounting are the renewed sense of well-being needed in building human security, and breaking of old patterns, relations, and institutions to give way to new ones in the economic, political, and social spheres. Peace dividends include the following (Ferrer, 2013):

- Budgetary savings that translate into increased budget for social services, which will benefit the bigger society, including military men and their families. Indeed, military forced should be made aware that although war benefits their corporate interests, as citizens, they will also shoulder the cost of war and suffer the same poor social services and welfare as does the rest of society.
- Earnings from unhampered economic activities.
- Boosting of the environment for non-war sustaining economic activities, favorable condition for empowerment projects, and the shift to production of socially beneficial consumer goods and services.
- Return to a sense of normalcy, lessened physical insecurity, and having a greater sense of well-being.
- Disruption of old patterns and a halt to the reproduction of abusive power and violence. Peace lessens the remand for war resources, to the disappointment of arms traders and suppliers. It removes the cover for criminal activities like drugs smuggling and the black market for precious/semiprecious stones and timber.
- Creating the environment for other political, economic, ecological, and social reforms.

Positive Peace and Sustainable Development

A policy framework should consider the attainment of negative peace as necessary to put in place positive peace and sustainable development. At the same time, it proposes initial measures combining an end to open hostilities through political negotiations, and small-scale, immediate economic development packages as measures that can bring about negative peace. Through such steps, the spiral of peace and development is set in motion. This perspective does away with the unnecessary, even acrimonious, debate on whether peace precedes development or vice versa. A more dynamic, dialectal relationship between peace (positive and negative) and development (short-term and sustainable) is established (Ferrer, 2013).

Indeed, if there is need to break the link between resource exploitation and war, we must likewise strengthen the link between sustainable development and peace. The development discourse must incorporate the peace perspective, and the discourse must integrate the perspective of sustainable development. This policy advocacy is not only directed at states who make the decisions but also to civil society groups cut up into

various advocacies, losing track of the interrelatedness of peace and development, on the one hand, and of war and resource exploitation and destruction, on the other hand.

These assertions are not new but they continue to be disregarded or ignored for other benefits. It seems to be oblivious to all the past experience and lessons that highlight the nexus between peace and development, preferring to treat the threat of terrorism with brute force, and to lump all legitimate but armed claims for resource redistribution and economic uplift under its ambit. The protagonists and antagonists in the global war on terrorism have benefactors and beneficiaries who feed the spiral of violence at the expense of other societal processes, and who do so at a huge cost to the environment and all humanity.

2.4 The Links between Ethnic Conflict, Civil Society and Peacebuilding

With the eruption of ethnic wars in Europe, Asia and Africa, the role of civil society as a tool to resolve ethno-religious conflict has been significant. Numerous politicians, scholars and practitioners around the world believed that civil society is the initiator and sustainer of peace processes. The followings will provide some concepts of the links between civil society and ethnic conflict.

2.4.1 Civil Society and Conflict Management

In Paffenholz's view (2010), civil society, civic engagement, and peacebuilding have important roles to play in peacebuilding. Based on an analysis of civil society functions, this study concluded that civil society can make important contributions to peacebuilding in the short, medium and long terms. The most important function of civil society in peacebuilding seems to be advocacy, particularly in terms of making the voices of civil society heard and bringing important issues to the peacebuilding agenda. Other civil society roles are also important for peacebuilding, especially human rights monitoring which contributes to the protection of civil society, through joint activities that can build bridging ties across divided societies. Civil society, however, needs a functioning state to perform its role efficiently.

According to Fischer (2006) in an article called Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Ambivalence, Potentials and Challenges, the potential contributions of civil society actors for peacebuilding and conflict transformation is important. Support for civil society should be further developed as a key element of

development and peace politics. Peacebuilding and conflict transformation require an integrated approach that addresses state institutions, economic structures and civil society.

According to an article *Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace*, Barnes (2009) agreed that civil society is a potentially powerful sector that can mobilize to either escalate conflict or facilitate its resolution. In addition, preventing conflict and building sustainable peace requires strategies that address structural causes of conflict and enable partnerships between civil society actors at the local, regional and global levels to interact with governments, inter-governmental organizations and businesses. In the conflict cycle, civil society play various roles at different stages from prevention, early operational crisis response during violent conflict, peacemaking, prevention reoccurrence and post-settlement peacebuilding.

Marchettia and Tocci (2009) analyzed the relationship between civil society and conflict in an article called *Conflict Society: Understanding the Role of Civil Society in Conflict*. Their study provided an analytical framework to reveal this complex relationship and assessed the impacts which civil society may have on conflict. Moreover, it examined more specifically the role of civil society in ethno-political conflicts. Finally, the article specified the identification of different factors determining the impact of civil society on conflicts, including political identities, frameworks of action and political opportunity structures in which civil society actors operate. In conclusion, three main macro-impacts of civil society in conflict can be outlined: fueling conflict, holding conflict in the short-term and peacemaking impacts.

2.4.2 Third-party Strategies with Conflict Transformation

Reimann (2006) is concerned with three approaches to conflict management: conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. The role of three-track actors and their strategies are applied in the three approaches. The third-party strategies consist of three actors called Track I, Track II and Track III. Track I activities include official and non-coercive measures, such as fact-finding missions, facilitation, negotiation, mediation and peacekeeping, to more coercive measures, such as power-

mediation, sanctions, peace-enforcement and arbitration. In contrast to Track I, Track II refers to all non-official and non-coercive activities, such as facilitation, consultation and mediation. Finally, Track III refers to all activities initiated and undertaken by actors involved in grassroots training, capacity building and empowerment, relief work, human rights, and humanitarian assistance.

The three approaches to conflict management engage different actors and adopt multiple strategies taken. First, *Conflict Settlement* refers to all strategies for achieving an outcome that ends direct violence, without necessarily addressing the underlying conflict causes. The second approach, *Conflict Resolution*, refers to all process oriented activities that aim to address the underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural violence. These can be drawn from civil society groups, academic institutions and all forms of civil mediation or citizen diplomacy groups, including local and international conflict resolution NGOs operating at Track II level. The last approach, *Conflict Transformation*, refers to outcomes, processes and structures oriented toward long-term peacebuilding efforts, which aim to overcome revealed forms of direct, cultural and structural violence. The goal of conflict transformation moves beyond the aims of both the previous approaches. The Track III strategies aim to support local struggles for social justice and thus for radical, structural change. Whereas Track I and Track II actors in the conflict settlement and conflict resolution approaches tend to view the civilian population and grassroots levels as passive, Track III strategies put them as a center-stage actor of conflict resolution. It is obvious that Track I or Track II approaches alone cannot provide an efficient solution for contemporary violent conflicts. Therefore, Track III strategies need to be included in the peacebuilding process.

2.4.3 Roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

There have been some attempts to classify the roles or functions of civil society involved in the peacebuilding process. It is recognized that civil society roles are complex and varied, and there are many grey areas and overlaps. The core roles of civil society offer a suitable framework to better understand the potential contribution of civil society to peacebuilding. The following are some researchers who have attempted to reach conclusions on the general roles of civil society in conflict resolution.

Paffenholz (2010), an expert in conflict and peacebuilding, applied the proposed analytical framework to assess the different functions of civil society in peacebuilding. These functions can be helpful to analyze civil society's functions more systematically. Paffenholz classified seven functions of civil society in peacebuilding: (1) Protection; (2) Monitoring and accountability; (3) Advocacy and public communication; (4) Socialization and culture of peace; (5) Conflict sensitive social cohesion; (6) Intermediation and facilitation; and (7) Service delivery.

Four types of organizations and initiatives are outlined by Das (2007). It helps to explain the role of civil society in making peace or producing conflict in India's Northeast which are (1) Civic representatives; (2) Peace groups; (3) Bridge-builders; and (4) Popular initiatives.

Barnes (2009) mapped out the main functions of civil society in peacebuilding in an article called *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace*. These roles are mapped out into eight main functions of civil society in peacebuilding: (1) Waging conflict constructively; (2) Shifting conflict attitudes; (3) Defining the peace agenda; (4) Mobilizing constituencies for peace; (5) Reducing violence and promoting stability; (6) Peacemaking/conflict resolution; (7) Community-level peacemaking; and (8) Changing root causes and building cultures of peace.

Based on an analysis of a collection of works on civil society's roles and functions in peacebuilding, and the researcher's own experience, Boonpunth (2016) listed eight general roles of civil society: (1) Security Protector, (2) Representative, (3) Bridge-builder, (4) Relief Worker, (5) Monitoring Observer, (6) Academic, (7) Public Communicator and (8) Peace-builder.

The aim of categorizing the roles of civil society is to determine the roles of civil society involved in creating sustainable peace and to enhance the effectiveness and impact of civil society's in peacebuilding. These roles' definition can be useful to analyze civil society contributions to build peace in the ethno-religious conflict in the Mindanao, Aceh and Southernmost Thailand. According to the framework of Paffenholz, the seven roles of civil society groups are as follows: -

1) Protection: The effectiveness of protection initiatives can be enhanced when they are systematically combined with monitoring activities and advocacy campaigns; equally needed for effective protection is an integrated media outreach strategy and

cooperation with international networks. The main activities for civil society within this role are protecting their own community, creating of zone of peace or safety zone, and providing human security activities.

2) Monitoring: The effectiveness of monitoring can be enhanced when activities are designed to reinforce protection and advocacy initiatives. In addition, outreach to national and international networks can also foster effectiveness. Monitoring should take place during all phases of conflict, and additional monitoring activities should be organized around the implementation of peace agreements. The main activities related to this function are creating political early-warning systems, reporting on human rights abuses, and giving recommendations to decision makers.

3) Advocacy: The effectiveness of advocacy initiatives increases when reinforced by knowledge of how to organize effective campaigns, and additionally accompanied by monitoring initiatives and targeted media strategies. Drawing the attention of the international community through collaboration with the media and international networks can additionally enhance overall effectiveness of civil society advocacy. The main activities related to this function are lobbying for civil society involvement in peace process, creating public pressure to the conflicting parties, and campaigning for specific conflict issues.

4) Socialization: The precondition for effectiveness of socialization initiatives is a low level, or the absence of, violence. It is essential to engage with influential pre-existing institutions, such as schools or associations, even if they continue to reinforce existing divides within society. This engagement can be effective when performed as a long-term process, rather than as short-term isolated initiatives taking place outside important institutions. Additionally, supporting organizations can be particularly helpful, when they promote democratic values externally and reflect these same values internally within their own structure. Finally, in-group socialization of marginalized groups is more effective when the empowerment takes place in a sensitive way that avoids fostering radicalization. The main activities related to this function are providing peace education, building workshops for a future peaceful society, and promoting attitude change toward peaceful conflict resolution.

5) Social Cohesion: The precondition for the effectiveness of social cohesion initiatives is again a low level, or an absence of, violence. The effectiveness of social

cohesion increases when initiatives aim at bringing people together for a common cause. Effective initiatives thereby aim at behavioral, instead of attitudinal, change. Long-term systematic initiatives are more effective than short-term sporadic events, especially when they focus on all cleavages and also attempt to bridge difficult groups in society. The main activities related to this function are strengthening links among citizens, rebuilding the positive social capital, and bringing adversaries together.

6) Facilitation: Local facilitation is performed at all times and does not necessarily need special attention or support. This also seems to hold true for national facilitation by eminent civil society groups. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of existing initiatives can be enhanced when targeted – rather than general – training is provided. For example, targeted community mediation training for refugee return in Bosnia was very effective, while general mediation training given to a variety of groups proved to be ineffective. In general, people did not know what to do with the acquired knowledge. The main activities within this function are facilitating initiatives between conflicting parties, between armed groups and local communities, and among the state, armed groups and local communities.

7) Service delivery: Service delivery is only effective for peacebuilding when it creates entry points for other functions. During war and armed conflict, aid projects often take place in conflict-affected areas. The systematic use of such projects for additional protection purposes can enhance their peacebuilding effectiveness. After large-scale violence ends or during period of low levels of violence, aid projects can be very effective in creating common platforms of cooperation and dialogue for adversarial groups. Basically, the activities of this role are seen as an economic task for the state such as providing services to war-affected people.

Chapter 3

Research Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology which includes the following topics: 1) research methodology; 2) key respondents; 3) data collection; and 4) questions for in-depth interview.

3.1 Research Methodology

A qualitative method was used in this research. This qualitative method employed the semi-structured in-depth interview with open-ended questions and observation technique together with documentary research.

To increase the credibility and validity of the data, this research made use of both primary and secondary data which was called 'Data Source Triangulation'. This strategy can help strengthening the research by increasing the overall validity and credibility of the collected data and the information used.

Data sources of both primary and secondary data were as follows:

- 1) Primary Data. This was collected through in-depth interviews. The semi-structured interview guide was used in the interviews.
- 2) Secondary Data. This included data from published books, academic journals, newspapers and articles posted on websites.

3.2 Key Respondents

3.2.1 The Case Study of Mindanao

There were some civil society groups researchers searched for overview information from secondary sources. However, many groups were located in Mindanao but researchers did not plan to travel to Mindanao as safety issue is aware. Therefore, the interviewed respondents were selected from the CSOs located in Manila. The civil society groups were the renowned groups in the Philippines. The interviewed respondents were the key persons in the civil society groups.

During the fieldtrip, the researchers managed to interview nine respondents. The lists are as follows:

Respondent 1: A Thai expert on the Philippines Ms. Sida Sonsri	3 July 2018
Respondent 2: Institute of Islamic Studies, UP Diliman Ms. Macrina A. Morados (Dean)	3 July 2018
Respondent 3: Center for Peace Education (CPE), Miriam College Ms. Loreta N. Castro (Program Director)	6 July 2018
Respondent 4: Center for Integrative and Development Studies Ms. Tesesa S. Encarnacion Tadem (Executive Director)	9 July 2018
Respondent 5: BALAY Rehabilitation Center Ms. Analisa T. Ugay (Executive Director)	11 July 2018
Respondent 6: Mindanao Solidarity Network (MSN) Ms. Mia Estiponia (Project Officer)	12 July 2018
Respondent 7: Mindanao Solidarity Network (MSN) Ms. Beverly A. Orazco (Program Director)	12 July 2018
Respondent 8: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZOPI) Ms. Karen Tanada (Executive Director)	12 July 2018
Respondent 9: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Mr. Anwar Upahm (ARMM-HELPS Program Manager)	14 July 2018

3.2.2 The Case Study of Aceh

During the fieldtrip in Aceh, the researchers managed to interview 14 respondents. The lists of key persons who work in civil society groups and the experts in Acehese peace process are as follows:

Respondent 10: Syiah Kuala University Mr. Haris Iqbal	21 June 2019
Respondent 11: Syiah Kuala University Dr. Muzailin Affan	22 June 2019
Respondent 12: Riset Center for Peace Dr. Otto Nur Abdullah	22 June 2019
Respondent 13: Acehese Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF) Mr. Juanda Djamal	24 June 2019

Respondent 14: Member of GAM Negotiation Team Mr. Nur Juli	24 June 2019
Respondent 15: Balai Syura Ureueng Inong Aceh Ms. Suraiya Kamruzzaman	24 June 2019
Respondent 16: LBH-BNA Mr. Syahrul S.H.,M.H. (Director)	25 June 2019
Respondent 17: LBH-BNA Mr. Aulianda Wafisa (Program Manager)	25 June 2019
Respondent 18: Member of GAM Negotiation Team Mr. Munawar Liza Zainal	25 June 2019
Respondent 19: Kata Hati Ms. Rai Fajri	26 June 2019
Respondent 20: KKR Aceh Truth & Reconciliation Commission Mr. Afidal Darmi	26 June 2019
Respondent 21: KontraS-Aceh Mr. Faisal Hadi	27 June 2019
Respondent 22: Syiah Kuala University Mr. Sumsul Alam	27 June 2019
Respondent 23: Syiah Kuala University Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hizir Sofyan (Vice Rector for Planning, Cooperation, and Public Relation Affairs)	27 June 2019

3.2.3 The Case Study of Southernmost Thailand

The data of role of civil society in southern Thailand were collected by observation technique and from the secondary data. The researchers updated the data at the general meeting of the ‘Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand’ at Tambon Yaling, Muang district, Pattani province, on the 18 January 2020.

The Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand was founded in 20 August 2011. The purposes of the groups are to develop potential of civil society; to find out solution and development southern border sustainable peace; to share knowledge among group that work for society; and to create space for public participation. There

were 24 civil society groups from 32 total council's members attending the meeting. The followings are attended civil society groups: -

- 1) Fasai Center
- 2) Network of Southern Natural Resources / Saiburi River Association
- 3) Foundation of Genius Orphanage
- 4) Chumchonsattha Network (Kampung Taqwa)
- 5) Center for Civil Society in Yala Province
- 6) Young Muslim Association of Thailand
- 7) Al-Salam Institute, Fatoni University
- 8) Al-Quran Center and Languages, Chariyathamsuksa Foundation School
- 9) Network of Civic Women for Peace (NCWP)
- 10) Zauquna Group
- 11) We Peace
- 12) Deep South Watch
- 13) Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD)
- 14) Buddhists Network for Peace: B4P
- 15) Prince of Songkla University Alumni Association Volunteers
- 16) Southern Border Peace Center, Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies
- 17) Civil Society for Peace and Sustainable Economy
- 18) Network of Justice Volunteers
- 19) Center of Cooperative Network for Helping Orphans
- 20) Center of Health Assembly Cooperation of Pattani
- 21) Southernmost Civil Society Media Network
- 22) Hilal Ahmar Foundation
- 23) Darussalam Foundation for Orphan and Underprivileged of Pattani
- 24) Agricultural Council of Yala

3.3 Data Collection

Firstly, the data was collected through secondary data sources including books, journal articles and internet. A number of civil society groups were selected for the first review. The backgrounds, locations and contact details of the civil society groups were reviewed before the fieldtrips.

Secondly, the fieldtrip in the Philippines was planned between 1-15 July 2018. The researchers based at the University of the Philippines Diliman in Manila. The researchers started with a few respondents recommended by Thai academics and also used snowball sampling method to get more civil society groups. The fieldtrip in Indonesia was planned between 9-15 June 2019. The researchers based in Banda Aceh and started with a connection from lecturers at Syiah Kuala University, Aceh. Snowball technique was also used. It ended up with a long list of interesting key persons.

Each interview session took approximately 30-60 minutes. The research team included two researchers. The main researcher proceeded the interview followed the interview guide. The interviews were proceeded in English. The other researcher was responsible for recording the interviews, taking notes and photographs if they were allowed. The respondents were asked to sign a consent form before the interview started.

Thirdly, besides the in-depth interview, the researchers searched the list of interesting documentary sources through electronic database. The secondary data of Mindanao conflict were collected from the library of University of the Philippines Diliman. Many sources about civil society in peacebuilding were found in a specific section of the University Main Library called 'Filipiniana'. This section provides books, serials and special collections in literature, history, political science, economics and sociology of the Philippines. The Filipiniana serial collection consists of periodicals published by academic and research institutions, government agencies, societies, commercial publishers, etc., and extensive sets of national and regional newspapers, current as well as retrospective.

A big number of researches and articles of Aceh conflict were widely found on academic websites. It helped to broaden views before the fieldtrip. Therefore, the researchers could focus more on interviewing during the fieldtrip.

Finally, for the last fieldtrip in southernmost Thailand, the researchers already base in the area and have been doing research about civil society. As the project budget was cut off, the researchers updated information on civil society groups by observing the general meeting of Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand on the 18 January 2020 at Pattani province. It was a perfect opportunity to attend the event because this meeting was an important one and most council's members attended. Besides, they had the new president election on that day, they hosted a focus group on 'Crisis and Challenges of Civil Society in the Deep South'. The event was very useful and relevant to the research topic.

3.4 Questions for In-depth Interview

The in-depth interviews were framed by an interview guide. The questions can be classified into three parts. The details are as follows: -

Part I: Contexts of the Conflict

- the contexts which are the most important to the root causes of the conflict
- the contexts which are the most influent to the conflict solution and peacebuilding process
- identify the phases of conflict: war, armed conflict, windows of opportunity for peace negotiations, and post-large scale violence
- understand the actors involved in the conflict: the state, donors, the media, external political actors

Part II: Roles of Civil Society

- understand the meaning of each function for peacebuilding in the specific context of the country
- assess the relevance of each function:-
 - role in protection of citizens against violence from all parties
 - role in monitoring of human rights violations and the implementation of peace agreement
 - role in advocacy for peace and human rights
 - role in socialization to values of peace and democracy as well as to develop the in-group identity of marginalized groups

- role in inter-group social cohesion by bringing people together from adversarial groups
- role in facilitation of dialogue on the local and national level between all sorts of actors
- role in service delivery of create entry points for peacebuilding

Part III: Policy Implication

- identify the activities of civil society actors along defined phases of conflict
the actors who have potential to fulfill these functions of each role
- assess the effectiveness of civil society activities
- an imbalance between implemented civil society activities and their relevance for peacebuilding

Chapter 4

Introduction to the Conflicts

This chapter is to give an overview of the conflicts in Mindanao, Aceh and Southernmost provinces of Thailand. It is important to understand dynamics of colonial, independent modern nation-states and the significant events to explain today's ongoing conflicts in Southeast Asia. This chapter includes two sections: background of the conflicts and the root causes of the conflicts

4.1 Background of the Conflicts

Today's ethnic diversity in Southeast Asia is the unfinished outcome of a dynamic evolutionary process. As such, there is no single explanation for the origins of this diversity (Rambo 1988 in Ferrer, 1999). The term ethnicity has been used to encompass culture which includes tradition, core values, language, religion, and common descent or ancestry. Ethnicity may be regarded as sub-units within the bigger national unit. On the other hand, ethnicity may cut across national boundaries, for example, the label 'Malay-Muslims' applies to the Islamized populations in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (Ferrer, 1999).

The study of inter-ethnic relations has usually raised to the fore issues relating to resource allocation and political participation. As a result, the state is always an important actor in inter-ethnic relations as an authorized appropriator of these resources. This is especially true if the state effectively is in the control of a singular ethnic or cultural groups as to create resentment and resistance from the marginalized groups. In such a case, the political relationship assumes a sharp ethnic character.

4.1.1 Mindanao

The Moros or Bangsamoro refers to the 13 Islamized ethnolinguistic groups who inhabit mainly the southwestern-most portion of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu in Southern Philippines. Moro groups are also referred to as indigenous peoples who have retained much of their indigenous lifestyles, beliefs and attitudes, among which are those relating to land and natural resource ownership and use (Ferrer, 1999).

Internal or domestic conflicts are armed challenges against the state by groups or force within the state territory. Such armed confrontations have been taking place in a significant scale in the Philippines. Many of the country's insurgent groups have persisted for more than one generation. Generational change, reorientation, regrouping and factionalism have also taken place over time but armed hostilities in affected area have continued, although the degree of intensity have differed or changed over time.

The contexts which are the most influent to the conflict solution and peacebuilding process is political issues. This can be explained by timeline which according to the presidential regime (Ferrer, 2013).

1) Marcos Negotiations with the MNLF

During the Marcos Regime, peace negotiations resulted in the signing of the Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (the Tripoli Agreement) in 1976. This granted a degree of autonomy to the Moro, in which the Third Section, Provision No. 16 states that "The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement," to which President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1618 in July, 1979, to implement the autonomy of Regions IX and XII. This degree of autonomy was unsatisfactory to many Moro, resulting in the unravelling of the Agreement and the splintering of the MNLF to produce the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984. Nonetheless, the Tripoli Peace Agreement, and the principles established in it, continued to be an important reference point in all future peace processes.

2) Aquino Process with the MNLF

Corazon Aquino succeeded Marcos from 1986-1992 and resumed talks with the MNLF, producing the Jeddah Accord in 1987, in attempt to further discussions on a democratic process for Mindanao. This was ultimately restricted by the 1987 Constitution that was passed as part of the democratic reconfiguring of the Philippines post-Marcos. Article X, Sections 15- 21 of the 1987 Constitution established regional restrictions, furthered by RA 6734, in August, 1989, providing an Organic Act for the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) following a plebiscite. The MNLF rejected the Organic Act, as well as the plebiscite-formulated ARMM, and negotiations were halted until 1992.

3) Ramos Process with the MNLF

In 1992, the new presidency led to a change in administration priorities, and the Ramos Period resumed peace negotiations. After four years of an interim ceasefire and exploratory talks, in 1996 the final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement was signed between the Philippines Government and the MNLF. The 1996 Agreement was intended as a two-stage process, with Phase I composing a 3-year transition period to join MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippine (AFP) and to undergo intensive socio-economic rehabilitation in the region, and Phase II consisting of the devolution of powers and the repeal of the Organic Act (RA 6734). While this was satisfactory for the MNLF, the MILF continued armed resistance, reaffirming their commitment to the establishment of a self-determining Bangsamoro territory.

According to Ferrer (2013), the framework of ‘peace and development’ figured significantly in former President Ramos’s program of administration from 1992 to 1998. Ramos pursued peace negotiations with major rebel groups arguing that when peace is achieved, the way to development is enhanced. The emphasis on development is also integral to the causes of rebellion. In the Administration’s ‘Six Paths to Peace,’¹ the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms must come first. Consequently, the government’s 1996 Peace Agreement with the MNLF created a ‘Zone of Peace and Development’ in the south, and an administrative body called the ‘Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development’. The transition mechanism provided a momentum for relative peace and stability that enabled the start of community development projects funded by a host foreign donors and several infrastructure programs. However,

¹ The first was the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of armed struggle and social unrest. The second path was consensus building and empowerment for peace through continuous consultation at the national and local levels. The third was peace negotiations with armed groups. The fourth path was implementing measures for reconciliation, reintegration of former combatants, and rehabilitation of those affected by the conflict. The fifth was conflict management and protection of civilians. The sixth path aimed to build, nurture, and enhance positive culture of peace.

the economic difficulties resulting from the Asian crisis that began in July 1997 and the lack of importance given to the process by succeeding administration of Joseph Estrada had stalled the process.

4) Domestic Stage Process with the MILF

Following the 1996 Agreement, a peace process began with what the MILF describe as the 'Domestic Stage', with solely internal actors participating and negotiating in the peace talks that focused on establishing and maintaining a ceasefire, creating a suitable environment to further progress in discussions of the 'Bangsamoro Question' in a more formal atmosphere.

After intensifying warfare against the MILF in March-June 2000, former President Estrada declared a four-point approach to the Mindanao conflict in his 'State of the Nation Address' given July 2000, which likewise posits the development proposition. Accordingly, Estrada pledged that the government shall vigorously pursue reconstruction and socioeconomic development in Mindanao, particularly those affected in the armed conflict (Ferrer, 2013).

It was tentatively concluded that the development proposition creates favorable conditions for toning down separatist. At the same time, it is also true that economic development alone has not prevented violence and the rise of radical fundamentalism where struggle is anchored on politico-religious aspirations above everything else.

This stage would continue until 2000, when the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks was signed, establishing the international community in the peace talks, beginning the Diplomatic Stage of the peace talks.

5) Diplomatic Stage Process with the MILF

While a majority of the MILF-GRP agreements were produced during this stage, one of the more notable agreements is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (MOA-AD). Viewed by many as the strongest manifestation and solution of the Moro determination, the ruling briefly halted the peace process, however negotiations resumed after a restructuring of the GRP Peace Panel and a mutually acceptable agreement between the Government of the Philippines and MILF was reached. This was codified in the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), which replaces the ARMM with the

autonomous Bangsamoro Region, and agreements as recently as 2015 are continuing to implement the establishment of a Bangsamoro Region. The implementation phase of the peace process is scheduled to conclude with an Exit Document agreed upon by both parties. This is one of the few processes to have been led by a female negotiator for the government side (GPH Peace Panel), with Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer acting as Chair for the GPH Peace Panel since 2012.

6) President Rodrigo Duterte

On 15 October 2012, a preliminary peace agreement was signed in the Malacañan Palace between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines. This was the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which called for the creation of an autonomous political entity named 'Bangsamoro', replacing the 'Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)'. The signing came at the end of peace talks held in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia from 2–6 October. These talks were the last of 32 peace talks between the two parties, which spanned a period of nine years (GMA News Online, 2012).

The Mindanao conflict is considered as having a big step on settling down the conflict when the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) was issued in 2018. BBL is a Philippine law providing for the establishment of an autonomous political entity known as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, replacing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (GMA News Online, 2014).

Legislative efforts for the establishment of a Bangsamoro autonomous region was first proposed and deliberated upon by the 16th Congress of the Philippines but failed to pass into law. The issue was taken up once again in the 17th Congress. The legislation was ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representatives on July 23 and 24, 2018 respectively. The bill was finally signed into law by President Rodrigo Duterte on July 26, 2018 (CNN, 2018). BBL seems to be a measure that seeks to help end decades of fighting in the south and certified as urgent by President Duterte (ASB-CBN News Online, 2018).

4.1.2 Aceh

The fighting for Aceh's independence was ongoing for more than centuries. The three-decade civil war in Aceh came to an end with the signing of a 2005 peace agreement—the Helsinki MOU—between the Free Aceh Movement or (GAM) and the Indonesian government. The large-scale violence has not reemerged and Aceh can be viewed as a successful case of conflict resolution. Yet, as in many other subnational conflict areas in Asia, large-scale violence has often erupted again in Aceh after years of calm. Since 1873, 86 of 139 years have seen large-scale armed resistance against Jakarta. Historically, peace in Aceh has lasted only as long as the generation who negotiated it has remained in power. The timeline of Aceh's peace process are as follows: -

1) Aceh during the Colonization

A distinct Acehnese Islamic identity emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The sultans of Aceh sought to expand Acehnese power into neighboring areas of Sumatra and the Malay world across the Straits of Malacca. Following the death of Sultan Iskandar Muda in 1636, Aceh slowly declined, losing its imperial territories. However, until 1871, the independent status of Aceh was tolerated by Britain and the Netherlands. The 1824 London Treaty between the two main colonial powers in the region formally identified Anglo and Dutch spheres of influence, with Aceh in the Dutch sphere. Nevertheless, British negotiators insisted on a provision that recognized Aceh's independence. In 1871, the British agreed to abandon its 'guarantee' of Aceh's independence in return for trade concessions. In early 1873, the Dutch bombarded the Acehnese capital, Banda Aceh. This initial incursion was unsuccessful but a second invasion the same year achieved some control for the Dutch. However, in contrast to other parts of the Indonesian archipelago, Aceh resisted military occupation, and guerilla attacks on the Dutch continued until at least the 1930s when the Dutch managed to co-opt many local nobles. Between 1873 and 1914, about 100,000 died on the Acehnese side of the war, and on the Dutch side about 16,000 were killed (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 8).

From the 1930s, a counter-elite emerged from among the local Islamic leaders (ulama). When the Japanese invaded the Dutch East Indies in 1941, they chose the

ulama who had more legitimacy among the rural Acehnese as their local functionaries. When the Japanese finally departed from Aceh after their defeat in World War II, the ulama supported an independent Indonesia, declaring the anti-Dutch struggle a holy war. Aceh became a bastion of the revolutionary independence struggle and the Acehnese were held up as archetypal Indonesian nationalists: indeed, they remain disproportionately represented among those officially named 'Indonesian heroes'. In recognition of their role, the region was awarded special status within the new Indonesian state. However, discontent grew in Aceh after the national government broke its promises to make Aceh a province and to allow Islamic Shariah Law. This led to many in Aceh joining the Darul Islam Rebellion in 1953, which called for an Islamic Indonesian state. This conflict was largely resolved in 1959 when Aceh was given 'special territory' status with broad powers to manage religion, education and customary law.

2) Conflict between Acehnese and Indonesian Government

As the Indonesian state gained strength under President Suharto and state institutions penetrated even the most rural areas, Aceh's special territory status became increasingly meaningless. Suharto sought to create a highly centralized state to hold ethnically and religiously diverse Indonesia together. In such an environment, providing special powers or even recognition to Aceh was out of the question. In 1976, Hasan di Tiro, an ulama's descendant, formed GAM and declared independence from Indonesia. The new movement had links to the old insurgency. The implementation of shariah law was indeed a core demand of the early GAM movement. Yet whereas Darul Islam had called for an Islamic Indonesian state, GAM saw the future of Aceh as being outside of Indonesia. Over time the narrative of the insurgents changed from one emphasizing a distinct Islamic identity to one based on broader principles such as democracy, human rights and economic justice.

Most of the early GAM leaders were killed or forced to flee Aceh and the insurgency was largely wiped out by 1979. Throughout most of the 1980s, most violence in Aceh declined. However, GAM cemented its networks in rural Acehnese society. Kinship ties were utilized for recruitment purposes and a GAM command structure emerged with commanders at multiple territorial levels. Between 1986 and 1990, around

1,000 GAM fighters received military training in Libya. The return of the trainees to Aceh led to an upsurge in violence in 1989 (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 8). In response, the Indonesian military sought to destroy GAM with force, unofficially categorizing Aceh as a Military Operation Zone (DOM) and launching a decade-long military campaign that killed thousands and resulted in widespread human rights abuses.

After Suharto was deposed in May 1998, Aceh was relatively calm. Yet, as elsewhere in the country, violence rose sharply as Indonesia's democratic transition unfolded. As in East Timor and Papua, the new political environment led to fresh Acehese demands. Initially these were for an investigation of human rights abuses and for meaningful special autonomy. However, continuing military abuses in 1999 led to a hardening of attitudes. GAM recruited from those who had lost family members or witnessed brutality. In February 1999, the remarkable offer by Indonesia's new president, B. J. Habibie, of an independence referendum in East Timor led to calls for a plebiscite on Aceh's status too. At least 500,000 people gathered in Banda Aceh in November to call for Acehese self-determination. This marked the beginning of GAM's third revolt and the movement grew rapidly in almost all areas of the province (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 9).

The government began peace talks in 2000 while GAM expanded its territory to around 70-80 percent of the province. National law 44/1999 offered a basic special autonomy for Aceh and Law 18/2001 extended the scope of autonomy to include economic issues (a large share of oil and gas revenues were to be retained within the province) and political matters (direct elections of the local government executive). However, as violence escalated, special autonomy was never fully implemented. New peace talks resulted in the December 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) but collapsed in May 2003. The Indonesian government then declared martial law. The province was sealed off and oversight from the international media and aid organizations were largely banned. Tens of thousands of additional troops arrived. The impacts of this new round of violence were deep. From the beginning of GAM's latest uprising in 1998 until the signing of the Helsinki peace MOU in 2005—an estimated 10,612 people lost their lives (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 12). The war also resulted in serious human

rights abuses, displacement, conflict-related mental or physical illnesses and over half of the province's rural infrastructure damaged.

3) Intra-conflict Aceh

Since the signing of the Helsinki peace agreement, the nature of contestation in Aceh has changed. The war was essentially a center-periphery struggle fueled by Acehnese grievances that were rooted in perceptions of economic inequity and lack of political and cultural autonomy. Battles between Aceh and Jakarta, carried out militarily by GAM and the Indonesian armed forces, were also underpinned by—and indeed fueled—local communal hostilities (See figure 4.1) (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 23).

The peace process has managed to resolve the vertical Aceh-Jakarta separatist conflict. However, it has also led to the emergence of new forms of contestation within Aceh - violent competition among local elites.

Respondent 17 said “ Before the peace agreement, we had one enemy who was either government or GAM. We avoid involving international organizations. It is hard to control them. We are not part of jihad or international religious issue. However, Respondent 14 and 21 agreed that distrust and social jealousy made local people dividing into groups such as GAM supporters and government supporters.

The presence of large resources, combined with the powers derived from Aceh's special autonomy status, have heightened local political and economic competition.

Respondent 10 said that “80 percent of Acehnese were GAM before. The today problem is from the internal conflict of GAM members. They do not satisfy with the benefits they got comparing to the other former GAM members. They tend to corrupt in many ways such as offering some job positions to get voted in exchange; hiring some unqualified people to work with the local government. They receive salary without doing any work. Many former GAM activists became involving in mafia business. They think it is the right thing to do because of them, today Acehnese can live peacefully”.




Figure 4.1 Changing Forms of Contestation in Aceh

Source: Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 8

To a large extent, current divisions among elites are not based on the old conflict cleavage which pitted leaders who advocated independence against those who wanted Aceh to remain within Indonesia. Instead, new conflict has emerged among the Acehese elites. (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 31) Post-MOU, there have been increasing tensions between members of the Aceh elite—including the former GAM commanders who now control Aceh's politics and economy—and community members. Rising inequality within Aceh has led to small-scale but frequent violence.

A final form of contestation in post-conflict Aceh is between local communal groups. This has continued since the war, but the groups' identities and differences are constructed, and across which violence occurs, have evolved since the peace agreement (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 40). Old conflict cleavages are becoming less important. Aceh saw some inter-communal violence during its civil war. The separatist war was not ethnic, in that it did not pit two identity groups living side by side against each other. In general, there were not major divides between those who supported Acehnese independence and those who did not. There was a strong degree of support for GAM's goals, if not always its means, among the civilian population in most areas of Aceh.

New forms of inter-communal conflict and violence Inter-communal violence in post-conflict Aceh is more likely to relate to local economic competition and jealousies. Sources of conflict are differences between those who received aid and those who did not, and between the rich and poor; the latter was more likely to have resulted in violence. Tensions between migrants and those receiving them, and between former combatants and others, were less pronounced. Besides criminal acts, the most common source of violence in post-conflict Aceh is acts of vigilante popular justice where individuals or groups use violence to respond to the perceived misdemeanors of others. From 2008-2012 such incidents made up a larger share of violent incidents in Aceh than in the other eight Indonesian provinces, and the incidence of such violence has risen sharply (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 42).

4.1.3 Southernmost Provinces of Thailand

The beginning of the conflict in the south was when the policy of administrative centralization was introduced in the late nineteenth century (Funston, 2008: 8). The government policies of nationalism and centralization affected Malay-Muslims in every aspect. Tensions between governments and local Muslims in the south continued and sometimes intensified. The first recognized uprising was the 'Dusun Ngur Rebellion' and then many resistance movements were formed and active in this area in the late 1960s.

1) The Dusun Ngur Rebellion

The chairman of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir, established the Patani People's Movement in early 1947. Haji Sulong was a modernist religious leader educated in Mecca, Saudi Arabia and heavily influenced by a strict Muslim society. The Movement petitioned for seven requests including local autonomy, language and cultural rights, and implementation of Islamic law.

Fifty-five leaders in Narathiwat followed Haji Sulong's lead and presented a similar list of demands. Before Prime Minister Pridi Banomyong² had a chance to respond to their requests, General Phibulsongkhram mounted a coup and re-took office in November 1947. The military government's response was to imprison Haji Sulong and several other religious leaders on treason charges in January 1948.

Haji Sulong's imprisonment was the beginning of serious resistance to Thai rule. Malay officials in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat boycotted meetings with Thai administrators and planned to boycott the 1948 national election. Rebellions broke out in the three provinces, including a mass protest outside the police station where Haji Sulong was imprisoned. He was moved out of the southern provinces for trial, but the protest did not end. Riots erupted all over Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The biggest one was known as the 'Dusun Nyur Rebellion' in Narathiwat on 26-28 April 1948. Hundreds of men were led by a religious leader, Haji Abdul Rahman, against the police resulting in the deaths of some 400 Muslims while thousands more fled to Malaysia. Haji Sulong was eventually released from prison in 1952, but disappeared along with his eldest son, Ahmad Tomeena, in 1954, and was presumed to have been drowned by the police (International Crisis Group, 2005: 5). The expansion of Malay resistance in the 1950s was accelerated and consolidated by the formation of militant groups.

2) 1960-1990 Rebellion and Conciliation

Conflict intensified after the 1957 coup led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat who strengthened assimilationist policies, resettled ethnic Thais in the region, and tried to assert control over Islamic schools. As a result of that, local Malays formed several

² Pridi Banomyong, was the seventh Thai Prime Minister. He was one of the prominent leaders in the 1932 coup that changed the absolute monarchy in Thailand to a constitutional one.

militant movements to respond against the state and to try to gain independence (Funston, 2008: 9).

Over 60 armed groups, including Muslim separatists and Thai and Malaysian communists, were operating in the south in the late 1960s. Their tactics, including extortion, kidnap, murder and arson, were identical. The goals of the armed separatist movements were broadly similar, but they rarely cooperated. There was no leader who could command broad support like Haji Sulong had done. Attempts to coordinate all these armed groups were ultimately unsuccessful, and internal conflicts significantly weakened the major groups (International Crisis Group, 2005: 6).

After almost two decades of intense campaigns against separatist and communist insurgencies in the south, the government realized that its battle had to be political as well as military. In 1981, the government of Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanond overhauled security policies and administrative structures to pursue political accommodation. The new approach, which emphasized public participation and economic development rather than a purely military strategy, was effective. Although violent incidents never ceased completely, they were greatly reduced. Hundreds of militants, communists and separatists, accepted an amnesty and decided to participate in Thai politics (International Crisis Group, 2005: 6).

3) New Round of Violence

A new round of violence opened on the night of 24 December 2001 with five well-coordinated attacks on police posts in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat that left five officers and a village defense volunteer dead. The simultaneous attacks were more well-planned than the sporadic extortion, arson and kidnapping for ransom seen for more than a decade, and set a pattern that has continued. This pattern has seen coordinated attacks on police posts and raids by masked gunmen to capture weapons.

The first major incident in 2004 was a raid on the Royal Thai Army's 4th Engineering Battalion in Cho Airong district, Narathiwat on 4 January. In a carefully planned, well-coordinated series of attacks at around 2 a.m., at least a hundred assailants stormed into the army development battalion base and seized some 400 weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and rocket launchers. The raiders

killed four Buddhist soldiers guarding the arsenal, but none of the Muslim guards. Not only was the camp raided, but insurgents also launched arson attacks on twenty schools and three police posts across eleven of Narathiwat's thirteen districts (International Crisis Group, 2005: 17).

The second incident is called 'The Battle of Krue Se Mosque' on the 28 April 2004. A group of assailants attacked some security checkpoints where the assailants stabbed one police officer and one soldier to death (International Crisis Group, 2005: 22). The Commander of the Pattani Special Task Force immediately dispatched a patrol team to assess the situation. The soldiers blockaded the mosque with a tank and tried to persuade the militants to surrender, but their leader repeatedly stated that they would fight to the death. Soldiers and militants exchanged gunfire which lasted around an hour. After negotiations failed, Special Forces troops were ordered to storm the mosque and shoot to kill. The battle at Krue Se Mosque was not the only clash that day. Ten small groups congregated before dawn in mosques across Yala, Pattani and Songkhla and, after prayers, launched simultaneous pre-dawn raids on rural checkpoints, police stations and army bases (International Crisis Group, 2005: 23). At the end of the day, five policemen and soldiers were killed, while 106 militants lost their lives. This included casualties from the siege of Krue Se Mosque in which all 32 militants who took refuge in the mosque and exchanged gunfire with authorities were killed (National Reconciliation Commission, 2006: 46).

Another incident happened in Takbai on the morning of 25 October 2004. During the fasting month of Ramadan, approximately 1,500 people gathered outside the Tak Bai police station in Narathiwat. They gathered to protest the detention of six village defense volunteers who were on charges of allegedly stealing guns from the local defense forces. Protestors at Tak Bai claimed the men were innocent and had been detained unjustly. After some protestors tried to break through the police barrier, warning shots, fire engines, water cannon and tear gas were used to disperse the crowd. Police and soldiers ordered protestors to lie face down on the ground and then tied their hands behind their backs. Approximately 1,300 protestors, stacked in trucks up to five or six layers deep, were taken to Inkayuth army base in Pattani for questioning. After

five-hour drive, 78 protestors were dead, mostly of asphyxiation. Many others had broken and dislocated limbs and other ailments.

4.2 Root Causes of the Conflicts

4.2.1 Mindanao

The causes of the conflicts are multiple and complex. They include legitimate issues such as relative and/or absolute deprivation; political, social, and/or cultural marginalization; landlessness; militarization; human rights violation; and resource exploitation. Increasingly, the view that ethnic mobilization arises purely or merely as an expression of primordial ties or needs is on the decline; instead, modern ethnic mobilization is attributed to changing socioeconomic and political factors – specifically, the present postcolonial restructuring process in the context of global capitalism, which have aggravated existing social and economic disparities and communal rivalries (Ferrer, 2013).

1) Conflicting Land Use and Ownership Patterns

In Fianza's paper (Ferrer, 1999), the conflict in Mindanao between the Moros and the Christianized settlers/Philippine government is framed as a conflict arising from opposing systems of land use practices. In the traditional Moro view, land is inherited and held in usufruct by the community. It is non-alienable and held in trust by the datu or chief. Such concepts are founded both on customary law and Islamic practices on land tenure. The persistence of these indigenous conceptions in some Moro ethnic groups, includes the use of traditional boundaries, customary proofs of ownership (e.g. presence of burial grounds and permanent structures), and traditional modes of measurements. However, in many communities in present-day, the legal requirements on land tenure based on the system of private property and new farming technologies have substantially altered practices.

The influx of non-Moro farming migrants, particularly in the first half of the 1900s during American colonial rule, led to the alienation of communal Moro lands, Colonial and post-colonial policies of the Philippines state facilitated the penetration of Mindanao in the form of foreign owned corporate plantations, non-Muslim homesteaders, and government projects, all of which encroached on Moro communal lands. Militarization in the 1970s to quell Muslim resistance led to more dispossession, as corroborated by

the personal experiences of interviewees. Today, however, land scarcity and monopoly of prime lands in the hands of big agribusiness corporations, wealthy Christian landowners and a small landowning Moro elite, have impoverished Moro, Christian and Lumad (non-Moro indigenous groups) farmers alike. The altered relations with their ancestral lands not surprisingly have allowed them to adopt to the state's framework founded on the notions of eminent domain and private property. In effect, external processes, more than internal ones, have brought about this alienation of Moro land and land use practices.

The loss and expropriation of Moro ancestral lands and resources and the erosion of the people's indigenous land use practices either by public policy (and events/changes resulting from it) or by outright landgrabbing has also affected other Moro ethnic groups although little has been documented about the latter's experiences in this context (Ferrer, 1999).

2) Economic and Development

The economic conditions can make the conflict situation get worse. Among the Philippines' seventy-seven provinces, the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is poorer in many ways. Average annual income in the region has been lower than the median income at the National Capital Region (NCR).

Only six out of ten ARMM residents aged ten to sixty-four years enjoyed functional literacy, compared to nine of ten in the NCR. All the development indicators put the ARMM provinces at the bottom of human development among the country's seventy-seven provinces. They are among the highest in poverty rates, if not highest. At the same time, they are the lowest in life expectancy of high school graduates, primary and high school enrolment rate, functional literacy, and population not using improved water sources (Ferrer, 2013). Mindanao has also shown highly uneven development, with the conflict areas having the lowest levels of growth. The absence of state public services in the ARMM also contributes to fragility and instability in the region. Regional government spending on public services is low, and the provision of healthcare and education in the region is inadequate.

3) Intercommunal Tensions

The conflict primarily consisted of open violence and discrimination against Muslims by the Philippines government. The conflict between the Muslim natives and

the Christian immigrants has spread politically through discrimination. Intercommunal tensions are also prevalent in Mindanao. Moros do not constitute a single ethnic group. Numerous Muslim ethnic groups have distinct linguistic and cultural traditions while at the same time identifying as Moro because of their religion. Moreover, there are sizeable populations of descendants of Christian settlers from other parts of the Philippines living in the ARMM, as well as non-Muslim indigenous tribes, referred to collectively as Lumad (Strachan, 2015).

4.2.2 Aceh

Such economic grievances combined with resentment over perceived cultural domination by the Javanese. After the end of the civil war, Aceh was still facing many obstacles such as lack of autonomy, the appropriation of Aceh's natural resource wealth and lack of economic opportunities. Respondent 10 stressed that "Aceh is an abandon city" Root causes of the conflict in Aceh are as follows: -

1) Historical Grievances

Aceh was an independent state with sultanate for some 500 years. Respondent 10 explained that "Acehnese fought because of the prestige. We had our own king, own empire before the Dutch arrived and Indonesian State occupied". Aceh suffered from invasions from other countries which began in 1873 when the Dutch wanted to colonize Aceh. After a 30-year-struggling fight, the Dutch gained control but never fully conquered Aceh. After the declaration of independence from the Dutch in 1945, Aceh enjoyed significant autonomy for a short while. Not long after that, Aceh was incorporated into North Sumatra province. Although today Aceh's status is a special territory, the central government does not give them political and cultural autonomy as it promised, leading to continued dissatisfaction among the Acehnese (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 12). Broken promises compounded this dissatisfaction would lead in escalation of conflict.

2) Political and Cultural Autonomy

Victory over the colonial powers did not lead to the establishment of the state of Aceh as the Acehnese elites had wanted. Instead, it rather to the centralization of most political and economic powers in the hands of the central government. Aceh's

special region status was denied by the government. Acehese elites were further marginalized through the filling of jobs in Aceh's administration with only loyal followers of Suharto. Furthermore, the policy of 'homogenization' (Heiduk, 2006: 8) of state and society, which was to guarantee Indonesia's stability as a nation, forced all political organizations to become incorporated into the collusive, neo-patrimonial system set up by Suharto - leaving no political space for opposition on the national or local level at all. Thus, these factors, lack of political decision-making powers in Aceh, limited right to use shariah law, little opportunity for GAM elites to run for public office and human rights abuse, increase anti-Jakarta sentiment among Acehese (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 12).

3) Unfair Economic Distribution

Aceh became important for the national economic since the discovery of large natural gas and oil fields in the north of the province, near the town of Lhokseumawe at the end of the 1960s. From the late 1970s until recently, Aceh's economy was highly dependent on gas production. However, the contribution of gas to the regional economy has declined sharply. The discovery and development of massive natural gas fields off the east coast in the early 1970s did not benefit most Acehese (Heiduk, 2006: 8). Only about five percent of the profits flowed back into the province, whereas the rest stayed in Jakarta (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 12). By the end of the 1980s, Aceh was contributing 30 percent of Indonesia's oil and gas exports. Rapid industrial growth in the Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone did not develop Aceh's broader economy but negatively impacted traditional peasant agriculture and fish farming as farmers' land was appropriated and their communities resettled. Only few local people worked or invested in gas extraction because it is capital intensive. The large investments made in Aceh needed extensive foreign funding, leading to a nexus between foreign capital and the Suharto government. This way of investments sparked resentment within Aceh's people (Heiduk, 2006: 8). This, combined with the centralization of all political and economic powers in Jakarta, led to a lack of autonomy for the provincial government and to disadvantages for local businessmen compared to their competitors from other parts of

Indonesia. Therefore, it was increasingly easy to blame development failures on the Indonesian exploitation of Aceh's natural wealth.

Moreover, respondent 10 said that “The government came to take all petrol Acehnese had but never gave us anything in return. The government likes to give promises but never keep it. Aceh was left behind for ages”.

4) Lack of Development by the Central Government

Acehnese feel that they have been left behind by the central government in every aspect because local people have low quality of life and lack the necessary working skills (Heiduk, 2006: 8). Promises by the government of improving standards of living, jobs and economic prosperity had not been kept: farmers were disseized without compensation and the ecological system was damaged (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 17). Economic disparities within Aceh are also quite high among large cities such as Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe, and isolated districts such as Simeulue and those located near the North Sumatra border (Barron, Rahman & Nugroho, 2013: 18). The unemployment rate and private investment in Aceh are also very low comparing to North Sumatra and Indonesia (Heiduk, 2006: 8). Most jobs were given to higher-qualified workers from other provinces and contracts were made with Javanese or foreign companies. Barriers to investment include perceptions of ongoing insecurity and pressures to pay additional informal taxes/protection money to former combatants.

4.2.3 Southernmost Provinces of Thailand

Ethno-religious violence in the deep south of Thailand has multiple causes including historical concerns, economic marginalization, political issues, social and cultural differences, educational opportunity inequities and judicial discrimination. These have resulted in local grievances and a latent crisis in inter-ethnic relations.

1) Historical Issues

The Kingdom of Pattani was one of the most prosperous trading center in the 14th century before being defeated by Siam in 1785. Pattani was resumed its tributary status. The political history between Siam and the Pattani Kingdom was overlaid with different perceptions between the Thai state and Pattani. While the Thai government in

Bangkok perceives Pattani's history negatively in terms of a rebellious place, local people see the region as having a positive and brave history related to fighting for independence and an Islamic identity. In this sense, the political history of Pattani can be described as a 'discrepancy of perspectives' (Tangsupvattana & Poocharoen, 2009: 150). The memory of past political history is used by local people to mobilize their sentiments against the state. Muslim people's perception of history shows Siam as having tortured Muslims and treated them badly (McCargo, 2008: 150). This kind of anecdotal history has been passed on from one generation to another and it has created prejudice amongst Muslims in the south against the state.

2) Economic Issues

Thailand's wealth disparities between the center and the rural areas have resulted in the economic underdevelopment of the south. While the northeast is the poorest region, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are among the least developed provinces in the country (Croissant, 2005: 27). The government has failed to develop the economy according to the local peoples' needs because of a lack of understanding between the state and the people. The government perceives Muslim communities as being difficult to access because most people cannot communicate in the Thai language which makes it difficult to reach people and develop policies. At the same time, Muslim communities perceive outside investors as purely motivated by self-interest who are destroying the religious and social identities of the Muslim community. An example is the fishing industry, where all the owners are non-Muslims, but the laborers are mostly Muslims in the community (Tangsupvattana & Poocharoen, 2009: 133). Only the business owners gain advantage and become wealthy while the local people still have a poor quality of life.

3) Political Issues

The failure of the Thaksin government to remedy problems in the south indicated that the government was not on the right path. It failed to resolve problems by relying too much on political popularity around gaining votes (Tangsupvattana & Poocharoen, 2009: 122). The current crisis, however, is also a result of government policies that have aggravated the situation in the region. The insurgency problem in the south re-emerged after the Thai Rak Thai party-led government decided to impose

greater central control over a region traditionally dominated by the main opponent, the Democratic Party. Upon taking office in early 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin announced his intention to make major changes in the government's policy in the south.

Another measure to strengthen the new government's control over the region was the cabinet's decision in March 2002 to dismantle the successful intelligence and suppression operations against separatist groups. Even though the weakness of intelligence has been an obstacle in Thailand's security for decades, inconsistencies in the handling of the crisis by the Thaksin government aggravated the problem (Croissant, 2005: 31).

The state's response to the insurgency has been hampered by a lack of training in counter-insurgency methods, a lack of understanding of local culture, and rivalry between the police and the army. The army has responded to insurgent attacks with heavy-handed raids on Muslim villages which only resulted in reprisals. Insurgents have provoked the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim people. As most governments only had a short term in office, it was hard for them to produce tangible outcomes. As the government in Bangkok fails to resolve other urgent problems, it is doubtful that the southern conflict will receive the serious attention it deserves.

4) Social and Cultural Issues

The religious issue is very delicate one which the state must try to understand and attach importance to. Many Thai people think that in Thai society people should all be the same, and those who are different should change so as to be the same as the majority of the people (Tangsupvattana & Poocharoen, 2009: 123). Islam is not only a religion, but also a way of life for Muslims. Therefore, religion and culture are inseparable for people in the southern border provinces. People's identity in the region is very different from that of Thais in other parts of the country due to differences in language and religion. People in the region feel very much connected with those in Malaysia because they share similarities in terms of religion, language, ethnicity, culture and history.

Government officials who are sent to the deep south have very little knowledge about the culture and identity of local people. For example, some important Muslim regulations which people from outside should be aware of are dress and dietary

practices which should not be ignored or violated. While the vast majority of the population are Thai-speaking Buddhists, the southern Muslims are ethnically Malay and speak their own dialect (yawí), which few non-Muslims can speak or understand (Croissant, 2005: 29).

5) Education Issues

Ponohs play the most important role in maintaining and sustaining Muslim communities, Islamic teachings, Muslim culture, the Malay language, and Muslim ways of life in the region. Because of an imbalance among academic, vocational and religious education, only a few graduates from ponohs are able to further their professional degrees at the universities. The state has tried to control the activities, curricula and management of ponohs. There were a number of attempts to control and transform these ponohs into regular public schools which are normally under the control of the Ministry of Education. While most are registered with the Ministry of Education, some are beyond official supervision. Funded by private donations and founded by ustaz who themselves have undertaken religious studies in Pakistan and the Middle East, some ponohs became breeding grounds for potential radical Muslims.

According to Thai government sources, in the past 15 years, 5,000 Thai-Muslim students have graduated from religious schools and various Islamic universities in the Middle East and South Asia. After returning home, only a few graduates get professional jobs with the rest becoming religious teachers at ponohs in local communities, thereby contributing to the spread of more intense doctrine and radical versions of Islam, such as Wahhabism³ and fundamentalist Islam. Politically radical young ustaz and their students have become part of the movement toward militant groups in southern Thailand. This has resulted in an expanded pool of aggressive youths who have become the main targets for recruitment by extremists (Croissant, 2005: 30). Ponohs, therefore,

³ Wahhabism is a religious movement or a branch of Sunni Islam. Wahhabism emphasizes Islamic culture and the importance of avoiding non-Islamic cultural practices. Wahhabism is quite strict in what it considers Islamic behavior. It forbids some activities that some other Muslim groups/schools do not. Source: Wikipedia, *Wahhabi Movement*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabi_movement#Practices (accessed 13 March 2014).

are seen as a threat to national security because they enhance ‘fundamentalism’ (Tangsupvattana & Poocharoen, 2009: 145).

6) Judicial Issues

It is agreed that one factor which stimulates problems in the southern border region is injustice, often originating from state officials’ discrimination. A lack of understanding and acceptance of differences between the dominant Thai culture in Bangkok, leads to discrimination against other cultural norms. Injustice that derives from discrimination is demonstrated by a lack of knowledge and inefficiency to resolve conflict in Thai society (Tangsupvattana & Poocharoen, 2009: 122). As a result, people in the south have no faith in national laws and do not rely on the state’s justice process.

People in the south have always thought they are not Thai citizens and that they have been ignored by the central government. They consider themselves to be second class citizens. There are some cases showing that Muslims have been treated unjustly including the tragic examples of the Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents, and the disappearance of lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit who represented cases for Muslims and was tortured by the state. State officials were suspected in these cases but it seems no one has been held responsible for these tragic incidents (Tangsupvattana & Poocharoen, 2009: 151).

State officials have mainly used violent means to solve the conflict. Although heavy-handed means might stop immediate violence, the root causes of the problems has not been resolved. Violations committed by the police and the military have provoked fear and anger and strengthened the cause of the insurgents.

Chapter 5

Peace Civil Society in the Conflicts

This chapter is to give an introduction of civil society sector or people movements in the Mindanao, Aceh and the Southernmost provinces of Thailand. Civil society sphere in each country has a long history and different background. After understanding an overall background and how civil society sector was involved in peacebuilding history, next chapter will explain their specific roles in the peace process. This chapter includes two sections: an overview of civil society in peacebuilding and a timeline of peace civil society.

5.1 Overview of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

5.1.1 Mindanao

The Philippines civil society sector is invariably described by outside political observers as the most dynamic in Southeast Asia. The 1986 people's revolution ended more than a decade of authoritarian rule. What happened before and after 1986 is a complex story of how civil society can expand and deepen democracy in the Philippines (Serrano, 1993). As a whole, it is a collectivity of various groups and actors autonomous from and relating to the state in a variety of ways ranging from cooperation/partnership to confrontation. Operationally, it can be broken down into various types of formations such as non-governmental organizations NGOs, people's organizations (POs), professional associations, social movements, coalitions, and federations. Each society has its own set of dominant civil society organizational forms (Ferrer, 2005). Collectively, they form the organized base of citizens' movements pushing a reform agenda into the mainstream of public policy or reorganizing society around a radical vision. Civil society, or the self-organized section of society, is actually much larger than a narrow definition and includes all voluntary or free associations not only in the popular sector but also the private corporate sector. The popular sector of Philippine society is diverse in its ideology, participation and activities. The only thing that binds them together is a reform agenda around that elusive, catch-all word, 'democracy' (Serrano, 1993).

Sida Sonsri (2018), an expert in the Philippines' issues, defined civil society in the Philippines that people society or citizen who play political role by participating with the

state in public policy making. Many civil society groups are in form of ‘People Organizations: POs’ and ‘Non-Government Organization: NGOs’. POs are organization with any specific purpose such as economic, politics and social in the community while NGOs are bigger and support POs in technique, budget, etc. Importantly, both POs and NGOs are legitimately guaranteed by the government. They are partly supported by international organizations but free to organize their work. Both civil society forms are encouraged public participation and developed as a center for monitoring resources usage in the community. Therefore, civil society sector has broad meaning. Civil society in the Philippines can be classified into 12 types (Sonsri, 2018): 1) non-government organization, 2) community organization, 3) religious organization, 4) academic institute, 5) mass media group, 6) business group, 7) political movement group, 8) women group, 9) charity organization, 10) undeveloped community group, 11) political party align, and 12) military group.

People’s organizations (POs) make up the big amount of the popular sector, including peasants, fishers, agricultural and industrial workers, urban-poor communities, indigenous peoples, youth and students, women and children, media and church groups and even government workers. Popular movements in the Philippines also draw a substantial following from the middle and upper classes. NGOs in the Philippines are a fairly recent phenomenon. Before the 1980s there were only political and mass movements or a few ‘apolitical’ private voluntary organizations like the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) which was founded in the 1950s. Most of their current leaders and membership were or continue to be part of political movements. This largely explains the highly politicized character of NGOs in the country (Serrano, 1993).

Civil society organizations in the Philippines engage in a broad range of activities, the most common being in (i) education, training, and human resource development; (ii) community development; (iii) enterprise development and employment generation; (iv) health and nutrition; (v) law, advocacy, and politics; and (vi) sustainable development (ADB, 2013). It is worth noting that political activism takes on a larger role for Filipino CSOs than elsewhere. Indeed, CSOs played major roles in achieving Filipino independence from the Spanish and the Americans, in toppling the Marcos regime, and in ending the administration of President Joseph Estrada.

During the Spanish colonial period, the Roman Catholic Church and the religious orders established the first welfare organizations in the Philippines. They founded parochial schools, orphanages, and hospitals that were mostly reserved for the local elite. The church also established foundations which encouraged neighborly behavior, such as visiting the sick and helping with town religious festival preparations (ADB, 2013). The American colonial government delineated the boundaries between state provision of public goods, religious and private philanthropy. The Philippine Corporation Law of 1906 recognized the right to create private nonprofit organizations, and the government subsidized the operation of some of these organizations. The American Red Cross and the Anti-Tuberculosis Society set up branches in the country. The American Methodist and Protestant churches as well as the Church of England established schools and hospitals (ADB, 2013). With support from the government, hundreds of farmer credit cooperatives were created in the 1920s and 1930s, soon claiming more than 100,000 farmers as members.

After the President Marcos declared martial law in 1972, there was little space for civil society and almost no tolerance for advocacy NGOs during his rule. In areas where the government bureaucracy could not deliver necessary social services, other development stakeholders, particularly NGOs, had to step into that role. However, some organizations either fled underground by joining the armed struggle of the Communist Party of the Philippines, or sought shelter by affiliating with a university or religious institutions. During the Marcos dictatorship, many civil society organizations (CSOs) built up strong relationships with poor communities. The activism of CSOs eventually contributed to the People Power Revolution of 1986 that ousted Marcos and brought Corazon Aquino to power (ADB, 2013).

The President Aquino restored democracy to the Philippines, and several pieces of legislation favorable to civil society's development were passed soon after, including the Cooperative Code of 1990 and the Women in Development and Nation Building Act of 1992. Government agencies opened NGO liaison offices, and NGOs were permitted to negotiate directly with bilateral funding institutions for financing. Many communities began to welcome CSOs management of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funds, recognizing CSOs as effective channels for funneling support to needy communities (ADB, 2013). Owing to the favorable legal environment and the inflow of ODA funds to the

country, the number of CSOs mushroomed during the administration of President Aquino from 1986 to 1992. The rapid growth of CSOs during the period may also be attributed to the government's move to institutionalize civil society participation in national and regional development planning. However, in addition to those with good intentions, organizations of dubious integrity engaged in questionable practices. Some of these were established by politicians, businesspersons, and bureaucrats to advance personal, rather than public welfare. In response, ten of the largest NGO networks formed the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) in 1991 to promote professionalism as well as to expand the reach of CSOs and increase their effectiveness (ADB, 2013).

Today, the Philippines civil society organizations are widely seen as some of the most vibrant and advanced in the world. The Philippines has the largest number of NGOs per capita in Asia, and it is believed that civil society in the Philippines has contributed to democratization anywhere (ADB, 2013). Many of the key international NGOs and networks are based in the Philippines and headed by Filipinos. There are many types of CSOs in the country, but the more important types are people's organizations, development NGOs, and cooperatives. People's organizations are membership organizations representing marginalized groups and often organized based on sector, issue, or geographical area. Development NGOs act as intermediate agencies and institutions that typically operate with a full-time staff complement and provide a wide range of services to primary organizations, communities, and individuals. It is difficult to put a definite number to all the CSOs in the country, partly because many are unregistered, but also because there is no single official and updated database on those that register with government agencies (ADB, 2013).

5.1.2 Aceh

The situation of civil society in Indonesia before the peace agreement signed in 2005, there was no room for CSOs. It was such a long military process starting from 1976 and Indonesian government was very aggressive. In 1998-during the Suharto's era, CSOs led by university students who started to rise and gather at the university. For example, SIERA who helps refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In 1998, civil society groups led by university students were very strong in helping victims, collecting IDPs

data, building network, monitoring conflict, conducting conferences in many countries, supporting advocacy and democracy.

Respondent 17 said “CSOs in Aceh are very brave to confront with the military even they are only university students. Many of them disappeared or murdered during the civil war. They built up sodality among people like Papua, Jakarta and Medan”. Respondent 22 added that “Civil society groups initiated by groups of students should lead a role in development in the future”.

According to Respondent 17, GAM distanced themselves from CSOs because they avoided to get arrested or targeted by the government. CSOs refused that they were GAM although they worked for or supported GAM. CSOs were very strong because they were closer to the people and community than the government. CSOs tried to put themselves in the middle or self-determination while GAM wanted the independence and the government wanted Aceh as an autonomous region. Moreover, in 2003 Indonesian government and GAM were scheduled to meet in Tokyo but it turned out the arrest of GAM-designated negotiators on their way to Tokyo. After that, CSOs were asked to join the peace negotiation. The problem was that all CSOs wanted to be part of the negotiation. So, they invited 400 CSOs (women, ulama, religious leaders, business groups) to attend the 2-day focus groups in Malaysia on the draft of peace agreement”.

Respondent 11 said that “Before the tsunami, there are only a few NGOs because of the funding sources limitation. Moreover, civil society sector in Aceh did not open any information to the international groups. After the tsunami, there were very open to the outsiders. International organizations stayed for quite a long 4-year-period so they needed support from local CSOs to bridge them to local people. Then, they can maintain their activities by the local or central government. Some groups even created their own small business to feed themselves. After the peace agreement signed in 2005, Aceh situation was more stable. People were free to work, to do more activities or to speak out. It became good atmosphere for civil society sector. Many more clubs and CSOs were formed during this period”. Respondent 19 added that

“CSOs were always one of key actors who push the mechanism running in every important of peace process”.

It is the turning point of Acehese civil society, after the peace agreement was settled.

Respondent 22 said “The goals of civil society groups have changed from fighting for freedom to money or political position coming along with privilege. civil society’s role has changed to follower role and observe government and support good policy”. For international organization (Respondent 11), one of the challenges would be using Sariah Law in Aceh. It was difficult for outsiders to understand and follow. Moreover, Respondent 18 added “Before the peace agreement, CSOs worked together with one purpose which was peace. After the peace agreement, we work partially and separately depending on our missions. We compete each other to get funded”.

Furthermore, after the signing of the peace agreement, civil society groups are facing some difficulties, especially on funding sources. Although government provides some funds for civil society sector, they have to follow what the government wanted or deduct some fund and give it back to the government as an informal commission or it can be said ‘corruption’.

Respondents 21 mentioned that “Since 2015 civil society declined and stopped operating because there was no fund”. Respondent 21 mentioned “Some people who worked in civil society sectors became politicians. Some of them turned to be ‘typical politicians’ who make their own benefit come first. It is hopeless for local people to rely on local political party who became typical national party at the end”.

5.1.3 Southernmost Thailand

In comparison to other countries, civil society in Thailand has been characterized as weak. Civil society in Thailand has not been well-developed because of social circumstances, economic foundations and especially the history of its politics. Thai contexts are different from other countries where civil society space have developed or western countries where original patterns of democracy have existed for many years. Civil society groups in Thailand vary from one another in terms of background, ideals,

objectives, size, assets, and these give rise to different problems and complex issues at various levels. Civil society groups have various roles in Thai society. These include offering public services, supplementing government agencies in providing social support for the poor and other disadvantaged groups, monitoring public organizations and their activities, and advocating for justice, human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption measures (Lowry, 2008).

In the Thai society, role of civil society in promoting democracy was highlighted and further discussed after the Black May Crisis in 1992 (Pathan, 2002). The increasing usage of the term ‘civil society’ in Thailand reveals that the country is entering into a new stage of grassroots community awareness concerning citizenship rights and democracy. Its emergence, however, is still in its infancy (Chiangtong, 2000) and the research trend in civil society is not consistent.

After the upsurge of violence in 2004, more than 300 civil society groups attempting to build peace can be found in this region. Each group normally plays more than one role and their activities are varied depending on the target groups and their group’s purposes. The term civil society has been used in various ways for diverse purposes. This research describes civil society as being non-profit voluntary groups working for the same purpose and interest. The groups may be formed by members who have the same motherlands, cultural beliefs, religious affiliations, and occupations. The groups could be initiated and then supported by local people, the state, and private sectors. Due to Thailand’s circumstances, it is difficult for civil society to be created entirely by the citizen sector, without having the government involved. This is why the definition of civil society in southern Thailand has included some civil society groups which are part of state agencies or supported by the government and the business sector (Boonpunth, 2016).

Mistrust among Buddhist and Muslim communities is the most concern in southern Thailand conflict. However, there was a good sign for peace civil society groups in the deep south. One good sign is that the presidents of the ‘Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand’ are Buddhist and Muslim, alternatively. The new president selected on the 18 January 2020 was from Buddhists Network for Peace (B4P). He was elected unanimously by 16 out of 24 civil society groups. The new president said that “The first thing we should do is trying to make understanding between Buddhists and

Muslims in this region and encourage new generation to involve more on civil society network. Moreover, one of the most important tasks of the council is to trying to find as many as alliance groups”. Also, the focus group event (18 January, 2020) suggested that “Both generations should work together. We should avoid misunderstanding between ages. We should encourage youth council to work with other networks”.

5.2 Timeline of Civil Society and Peace Process

5.2.1 Mindanao

The growth of people movement or civil society sector in the Philippines highly related to the government stability and the presidents’ policies. This timeline can be classified as follows (Ferrer, 1997):

1) Under the Colonial Era

For almost 300 years from 1570 to the 1870s, the main state-civil society dynamic in the Philippines involved conflict between the colonial administration and the institution of the Catholic Church, arbitrated where necessary from Madrid. The Catholic Church has its own judicial power, exercised primarily through ecclesiastical tribunals and these powers often came into conflict with those of state. In addition, the colonial state allowed commercial trades and professions, or the modern-day private sector, significant latitude in regulating their own affairs. In 1769, a consulate was established by Spain in Manila, an autonomous commercial court and organization of merchants. It was only in the final two decades of its rule, however, that the Spanish colonial administration began to nurture an explicitly autonomous social space distinct from the state (Gerard, 2013).

Under American rule, however, a more explicit and institutionalized civil society began to emerge, based on the further delineation in law of civil society and the market as distinct private spheres that existed independently of the state. For the first 13 years of direct American rule, from 1900 to 1912, this process was driven by William Howard Taft, who served as Governor of the Philippines (1901-1903). Taft sought transplant US-style, a democracy to the Philippines, a democracy based on local government rooted in towns and cities, fostering local self-reliance and a lean federal government with minimal direct state involvement in the economy or in social service provision. Both of these elements required an active civil society that could underpin local

associationalism and mobilize local communities to meet local needs for public goods and services (Gerard, 2013).

2) After the Independence (1946-1972)

From the independence in 1946, however, the Philippines state began to increase its power and authority over civil society and the market, often with American support amid significant challenges from restive social forces. Early in the post-independence period, in 1949, Congress approved a new Civil Code of the Philippines. Enacted in 1950, the Code set out a tentative Bill of Rights, which prohibited public officials from interfering with the rights of citizens. Including ‘the right to become a member of associations and societies for proposes not contrary to law’. Thereby, it consolidated the democratic features of the 1935 constitution and of subsidiary laws dating back to the beginning of American rule (Gerard, 2013).

In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos was elected President, triggering the gradual decay of civil society as it succumbed, first, to the exacerbation of patron-clientelism leading up to the re-election of Marcos in 1969, and then to the onset of authoritarian rule. The Presidential and Congressional elections of November 1969 were the most violent and expensive of the post-independence period, confirming the role of ‘guns, goons and gold’ as a significant if not decisive element in Philippine elections for decades to come. Amid widespread demands for electoral and constitutional reform, Marcos saw an opportunity to institutionalize and perpetuate his rule. In November 1970, elections were held for membership of a convention to draft a new constitution to replace the colonial-era constitution of 1935. With legislators banned from participation, the elections were relatively honest and peaceful. The Constitutional Convention (ConCom) began work in June 1971, but progress was slow and the convention was soon overtaken by political events (Gerard, 2013).

3) The Dictatorship Ferdinand Marcos (1972-1986)

With rising opposition to Marcos’ rule and political order rapidly degenerating, he declared martial law on 23 September 1972 with support from the armed forces. The declaration had dramatic consequences for the constitutional convention; some delegates were arrested and some went underground or fled abroad. Marcos issued decrees confirming the legitimacy of his powers. ConCom delegates agreed to cede authority to an ad hoc committee of 16 to prepare a draft constitution with the Office

of the President. Under the terms of the Election Code, the draft constitution had to be approved by popular referendum to become law, but a conventional plebiscite was risky amid the political instability that followed the declaration of martial law. To resolve the conundrum, Marcos created a radical new political institution in the form of ‘citizen assemblies’ and these assemblies were convened to consider the draft. The assemblies made a mockery of the notion of popular referendum.

The Marcos constitution of 1973 radically redefined the relationship between the state, the private sector and civil society. It retained features of the 1935 constitution that defined civil society – for instance the Bill of Rights, which protected the right to form associations or societies that were not contrary to law – but it removed others including the right to freedom of the press, to freedom of assembly and to seek the redress of grievances against the government, neutering the political powers of CSOs. It also maintained the separation of church and state and the tax-free status of NPOs, but effectively nationalized key areas of service provision, especially education, crowding out civil society and market provision. It redefined the powers and scope of the state, including the relationship between citizens and the state. In addition to circumscribed rights, citizens now had an explicit duty ‘to be loyal to the Republic’, and to help preserve ‘a just and orderly society’. The effect of these provisions was to radically recast the relationship between civil society, the state and the market. The 1973 constitution thus represents a careful delineation of the legal rights and duties of formal institutions under the ‘New Society’, which Marcos sought to foster, and a significant leader of violent tension between the state and civil society for the next 13 years (Gerard, 2013).

According to Ferrer (1997), only about 11 organizations preceded martial law. These included the big church organizations or programs like the Catholic Bishops’ National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), Justice and Peace, the Catholic Foundation of Asia (CFA), Media Group, and the Mainland (Mindanao), Development Center Association, Inc. Some are considered forerunners in their field, like the Federation of Free Workers, the International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, and the UNESCO Associated Schools Project. Notably, these groups have broader mandates and wide institutional resource bases that have withstood the passage of political conjunctures. Significantly, many of the organizations set up under the Martial Law Regime (September

1972-February 1986) were in the form of church-based social action programs, or initiated by other religious and/or academic institutions. Many cater to the needs of the poor and/or victims of political repression, and mobilized them to fight the dictatorship. Indeed, these service organizations with an anti-dictatorship orientation dominated the open, legal activism during the martial law years.

4) Post-Marcos Period (1986-1995)

At least 59 of the groups (Ferrer, 1997) included in this compendium of 102 peace organizations were set up during the post-Marcos period. In other words, they belonged to the post-martial law generation of social and political groups. The figure reflected the boom in the NGOs community after the February 1986 People Power Revolution.¹ In particular, it manifested the heightened concern for resolving the armed conflicts, addressing peacelessness in communities, and setting the country on the track of peace and development after the disastrous martial law years (Ferrer, 1997).

Other post-EDSA organizations with the word peace on their names are the solidarity (for peace) groups like the Coalition for Peace, National Peace Conference, Northern Samar Peace Advocates Group, Peace Advocates Zamboanga, Paghiliusa sa Paghidaet Negros (PsPN), Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference, and the Cebu Human Rights and Peace Alliance. Most of these young organizations were initiated by secular individuals and groups (although many draw resources from religious organizations) whose main activities are in the forms of campaign, lobby or advocacy (Ferrer, 1997).

Others like the Program Unit on Peace of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines, the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, the Peace Studies Institute, Desk for Muslim-Christian Relations, Alliance of Peace Communicators, and the Institute for Policy and Peace Studies provide conflict resolution services, research, training, secretariat, and/or organizing support on major peace concerns such as the political negotiations. Two groups attempt to exemplify the real possibility of harmonious coexistence between Muslims and Christians in the South. Others began as school based initiatives, such as the Notre Dame University Peace Education Center, Miriam Peace Core Group, and Children and Peace (Ferrer, 1997).

¹ It is also known as the EDSA Revolution of 1986. It was a series of popular demonstrations in the Philippines that began in 1983 and culminated in 1986. The methods used amounted to a sustained campaign of civil resistance against regime violence and electoral fraud.

No new political party with peace as a platform has been set up since the 'democratic space' opened up and allowed for more popular participation in electoral politics. Electoral reforms, nonetheless, is one major peace concern. It is a priority agenda in government negotiations with the rebel groups. On the whole, however, NGOs activity along this line remains scant and usually heightens prior and during national elections only (Ferrer, 1997).

5) The Violent Repression of Civil Society (1998-2010)

Clumsy legislative and policy initiatives that compromised the integrity of civil society were minor irritants, however, compared to violent efforts during the administrations of Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) and Gloria Arroyo (2001-2010) to repress CSOs and their leaders. Since the restoration of democracy in 1986, successive governments have faced difficulties in containing armed insurgent movements. The main threat comes from the New People's Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which has engaged in a military campaign against the government since 1969. The NPA is an illegal organization, although CPP has been a legal organization since 1992, when Congress repealed the Anti-Subversion Law. An important CPP front organization, the National Democratic Front (NDF), is also legal, although it largely operates 'underground', working primarily through allied CSOs with more visible presence. Subsidiary threats, however, came from a breakaway from NPA, the Revolutionary Workers' Party of Mindanao and Muslim insurgents in Mindanao, including MILF and Abu Sayyaf.

To contain these insurgencies, the government allowed varying degrees of autonomy to regular and paramilitary forces to kill, torture and detain suspects accused of collusion with the CPP or the NPA, despite the legal status of the former, and these efforts have stretched to a wide range of organizations perceived as sympathetic to the CPP, NDF or NPA. Under the Administration of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), the human rights situation in the Philippines improved substantially. But after 1998, the human rights situation deteriorated, as trust between the government and insurgent groups broke down and as executive and judicial controls over the armed forces became more lax, beginning with the regime of President Joseph Estrada.

Many of the difficulties underlying Gloria Arroyo's engagement with civil society in the latter years of her administration were prefigured by an earlier controversy. In the

'PEACe Bonds' saga of 2002, Arroyo was accused of rewarding organizations that helped to propel her to the Presidency in January 2001 and of striving to maintain their support though the use of financial inducement. In essence, the government helped to establish from scratch one of the largest CSOs in the Philippines (in financial terms) by providing CODE-NGO with unprecedented access to capital markets, in return, it was claimed, for CODE-NGO's vital role in coordinating *kompil II*, the mass movement and coalition that successfully precipitated the removal from office of Arroyo's predecessor, Joseph Estrada. Just as disturbingly, CODE-NGO, the Philippines' largest coalition of independent-minded development NGOs, was an active partner in the process, and a direct beneficiary, in the eyes of its critics, of 'rent-seeking' practices that it had previously condemned (Ferrer, 1997).

5.2.2 Aceh

The following timeline of Aceh's conflict was framed and summarized from the Worldwatch Institute (2018). It was classified into five sections from under the colonial era until after the Tsunami in 2004.

1) Under the Colonial Era

Since 1873 the Dutch began efforts to colonize Aceh, which had been an independent sultanate for some 500 years. After a bloody 30-year struggle, the Dutch gained control but never fully conquered Aceh. Next, Aceh was occupied by the Japanese for a short period during the World War II. Finally, Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands on the 17 August 1945.

2) After the Independence

Following an independence struggle, the Republic of Indonesia achieved formal sovereignty on the 27 December 1949. Aceh contributed to the anti-colonial struggle and agreed to become part of Indonesia, a decision that the Acehnese soon came to regret. Initially, Aceh enjoyed significant autonomy, but the government in Jakarta soon increased centralization toward a unitary state. In 1950, Aceh's special status was repealed, and it was incorporated into North Sumatra province. Acehnese supported the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java in an attempt to gain independence from Indonesia and establish an Islamic state during 1953-1962. Aceh was granted 'special territory'

status in 1959 but the central government does not follow through on its promises, leading to continued dissatisfaction among the Acehnese.

General Suharto seized power in 1966. Suharto's 'New Order' regime was based on the military as the dominant institution in virtually all aspects of life in Indonesia (concept of *dwifungsi* or dual function). The military consolidated its control over some of the most lucrative sectors of the Indonesian economy.

3) Discovery of Natural Gas (1970s)

In 1971, discovery of natural gas deposited in Aceh. The Arun fields became the source of about one-third of Indonesia's liquid natural gas (LNG) production, and helped Indonesia become the world's largest exporter of LNG. But the land of the local population is expropriated without compensation, pushing many into poverties. The Arun facilities are operated by Mobil, in partnership with Indonesia's state oil company Pertamina and a Japanese company. Mobil (merging into ExxonMobil in November 1999) obtained the contract through kickbacks to the Suharto family. Natural gas and Aceh's other resources (such as timber and minerals) were exploited mostly for the benefit of foreign companies and elites in Jakarta. Only 5 percent of the oil and gas profits remain in Aceh.

In 1976, Aceh's special status was removed in all but name. Excessive centralization, human rights violations, and unfair exploitation of Aceh's resources contributed to the establishment of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement), with the goal of independence for Aceh. By 1979, the small uprising was crushed by the Indonesian military. Mass arrests of GAM members, founder Hasan Di Tiro and other leaders went into exile in Sweden.

4) The Resistance by Acehnese Group

GAM fighters started a new rebellion after intensive military training in Libya since 1986. In 1990, Aceh was declared a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer, or DOM), essentially placing the province under martial law for the next decade. Jakarta doubled the number of troops to 12,000, and largely suppressed GAM by early 1992. The military carried out massive human rights violations against civilians. An estimated 9,000 to 12,000 people are killed between 1989 and 1998.

Severe financial crisis in 1997-1998 threw *the Suharto government* into turmoil. A popular uprising forced Suharto to resign. He was succeeded by Vice-President B. J. Habibie as the transition from dictatorship to democracy began.

Respondent 21 added that “In 1998, new atmosphere of openness of freedom rose after the fall of Suharto. Many new civil society groups were blooming. The main aim of civil society that time was to look for missing people from the conflict or victims of violence. The activities would be relating to missing people in Aceh, monitoring the state activities, writing reports to the public and embassies, acting as an international mechanism like UNHR section. After civil society got more connection, they organized meetings strengthening their voice. Moreover, they also aim at assisting about legal aids. Their roles are more on advocacy and make them realize what peace agreement needed”.

The *President Habibie* initiated a wide-ranging program of decentralization and took steps to limit the military’s political role. Many civil society groups suddenly became very active, and the military became a target of severe criticism from all segments of Indonesian society. However, the military’s business interests remained virtually untouched, and there was no reckoning with human rights violations. Aceh’s DOM status was lifted but military units orchestrate violence to torpedo withdrawal promises and justify their continued presence. GAM resumed its activities in November 1998. Although not everyone was in favor of GAM, or even of independence, the organization evolved into a genuine mass movement, reflecting Aceh’s growing alienation from Jakarta.

Abdurrahman Wahid became President in October 1999. Wahid’s administration drafted laws that were to give Aceh a larger share of the profits from natural resources. Unfortunately, his proposal to conduct a referendum in Aceh was rejected by the Indonesian Parliament. In November 1999, 1.5 million Acehnese demonstrated in Banda Aceh to demand a referendum on independence. The military resumed a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh. Civilian massacres took place, and several human rights advocates were assassinated. In January 2000, talks began between the government and GAM, facilitated by the Swiss-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (later known as the Henri Dunant Center). Later, the ‘Joint Understanding on a Humanitarian Pause for

Aceh' was signed on 2 June 2000. However, violence actually increased after that. Wahid signed a Presidential decree giving the military a freer hand in Aceh in April 2001.

In July 2001, after Wahid was ousted, *Megawati Sukarnoputri* was appointed President. She was strongly backed up by the military and police elites, who enjoyed a resurgence in their influence. Later, Megawati signed special autonomy legislation for Aceh, which was to give Aceh 70 percent of its oil and gas revenues. But implementation, starting in 2002, was largely limited to the imposition of religious Shariah law which many Acehnese said they did not want as also mentioned by Respondent 15. The prospect of more oil and gas revenues remaining in Aceh led to new opportunities for corruption among provincial government officials, the military, and others. A total of 21,000 soldiers and 12,000 police were present in Aceh. GAM was believed to have at least 3,000 fighters.

The 'Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA)' was signed on the 9 December 2002. The agreement led to the establishment of peace zones and a Joint Security Committee, and raising the prospect of international donor funding for reconstruction. Although killing drastically reduced, it failed to build trust and mutual confidence. Unfortunately, CoHA offices were attacked by Militias in 2003 and it led to the collapse of the agreement. Subsequently, martial law was imposed in Aceh. Some 50,000 military and police forced launch integrated operation to eradicate GAM. The military crackdown, including human rights violations, heightens resentment among the Acehnese.

Martial law was ended on 19 May 2004 and replaced by a state of civil emergency. This made little practical difference to the situation in the towns and villages of Aceh, as violence and repression continued. Having defeated Megawati in national elections, former General and Security Minister *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono* became Indonesian president in October 2004. His election manifesto included a pledge to seek peace in Aceh.

5) After the Tsunami in 2004

On 26 December 2004, a massive tsunami hit Aceh severely. There were an estimated 170,000 Acehnese victims. In late January 2005, government-GAM peace negotiations began in Helsinki, facilitated by the Conflict Management Initiative headed by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. After the State of Emergency was lifted by the government, the conflicting parties agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in detailing the terms of a peace agreement.

The MOU between Indonesian government and GAM was signed in Helsinki on the 15 August 2005. Then, Indonesian government granted amnesty to GAM members, in accordance with the MOU. The European Union-led Aceh Monitoring Mission begins its work, supervising implementation of the MOU. Decommissioning of GAM weapons and withdrawal of government forces from Aceh proceeds successfully. In accordance with the MOU, the Indonesian parliament was to pass a new Aceh governing law to give the province greater autonomy and greater control over its resource revenues, to permit the formation of provincial political parties contesting elections slated for April 2006.

5.2.3 Southernmost Thailand

1) Before the New Round of Violence

The history of ethno-religious conflict began in this area when it was ruled by Siam.² Since the central government of Siam attempted to change the administrative structure and rules in this area, it became unavoidable that Muslim elites, together with religious leaders, would fight for the rights of local people's identity against the central government. This kind of movement in the south against the state has been seen since 1975.

The second period of the civil society movement occurred when other problems were created such as the destruction of natural resources. Moreover, the key players in civil society networks became more varied and no longer included only the local elite or religious leaders as was the case in the past. The new generation involved in the civil society sector was comprised of graduates from the general state education system. The early civil society groups in this period were formed to fight for their rights over lands or local natural resources. One of the prominent leaders who protested against government projects which affected local people and the ecological system is a local Buddhist lecturer at the Prince of Songkla University. From fighting for various causes like local fisheries to Islamic identity, today's civil society sector includes gatherings of people who have knowledge gained from various types of institutions together with religious studies, while some groups consist of local politicians. They are all powerful groups of people who can form an effective civil society sector.

² Thailand was formerly known as Siam.

Two scholars (Deep South Watch, 2012) have made some comments concerning the civil society sector in the south. The first scholar, Chalit Tavornnukitkul, found that the beginning of civil society formation in the southernmost provinces was based on an attempt to conserve their identity and to be representatives of local people to the state. Two kinds of civil society groups were found in the south at the early stage. The first group was formed to maintain their identity and religious customs and to keep the balance of power between the locals and the state. The second type of civil society groups mostly gathered to fight for the community's interests over issues such as natural resources. The second scholar, Mark Tamthai, assessed the general work done by civil society in the deep south and found that there are two types. The first type is planned work which has been well organized. The second one is work which happens unexpectedly and needs to be done immediately. He argues that both types of work are important for the solution to the violence in the south.

The first formal organized civil society groups formed in the southernmost provinces were the groups that worked for the local natural resources reservations. The 'Pattani Bay Reserve Group' and the 'Saiburi River Reserve Group' that have been active in the south for more than 20 years are the prime examples of this. Besides reserve groups, there are some groups run by the community such as the Mosque committee and village career groups. Provincial Chambers of Commerce are also one of the civil society groups formed in this area before the upsurge of violence as they were set up in every province throughout the country.

The overall purpose of the civil society sector in this region before 2004 was concerned with social infrastructure such as activities based on identities and religions, local natural resources management, and community occupational groups; their aim was not to resolve the ethnic conflict. The turning point in the civil society's role in the south was the upsurge in insurgent disturbances in 2004. Many existing civil society groups shifted their focus to help people affected by the violent situation (Deep South Watch, 2012).

However, the idea of including civil society in a formal peace process has never materialized in a meaningful way in the history of Thailand. Thai military and civilian officials see the conflict as an internal matter and genuinely believe that it would be a

waste of political capital to bring in outsiders who could very well put the discussion of the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malay homeland on the table (Pathan, 2012).

2) The Second Round of the Violence in 2004

After the violence erupted in 2004, civil society groups have boomed with the main task being to help the victims of the violence. Many groups spontaneously formed after the upsurge in violence. Some of them had a short life while some have remained. A number of civil society groups have been developed into formal organizations in terms of legal registration. The target groups for most civil society groups are both Muslim and Buddhist people who have been affected by the violence.

As the violent situation has been ongoing in the region, many civil society groups have been recently established. The second round of growth in the civil society sector occurred from 2009 to 2012. It is noticeable that this occurred again only after the violence returned in the area. It could mean that the existing civil society groups are not able to respond to the needs of the people (Boonpunth, 2014: 236).

3) The Peace Dialogue

‘Peace dialogue’ sounds less threatening than ‘peace negotiation’ and it was hoped that the military would go along with the idea of a less structured approach and concept. The Thai government marked an important turning point in the southern conflict’s resolution when the first official peace dialogue was held on 28 February 2013 between the Thai state’s representative led by the Kingdom’s National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General, Paradorn Pattanathabut and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) headed by Hassan Taib. The latest peace dialogue was held in March 2020 between the new head of Thailand’s Peace Dialogue, Wanlop Rugsanaoh and the BRN’s Anas Abdulrahman. Both talks were facilitated by the Malaysian government.

The idea was to ‘expand a partnership for peace’. A wide net was tossed and participants included a former student leader, a women rights activist, a Buddhist mayor, and a Muslim religious leader. Supporters of the idea said it was a way of acknowledging that civil society was a stakeholder as well (Pathan, 2012).

However, these peace dialogues still had some weaknesses, for example, no cooperation among relevant Thai authorities; the main actors in the peace dialogues lacked experience, clear plans, roadmaps or timeframes; the Thai delegation lacked full powers over making decisions from the government; and the talk processes lacked

public participation and civil society sector. Moreover, the BRN is not the only insurgent group active in the south. Negotiation with only one group could create more tension among the other militant groups.

Today, limit of budget became problem of civil society groups since the military government was in power in 2014. The government has been strict for civil society groups to apply for international funding sources. Also, the government has pooled and centralized all funds for the deep south issues to Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). It is more difficult to get funding (Focus Group Event, 2020).

Chapter 6

Roles of Civil Society in the Peacebuilding

This chapter is to describe roles of civil society sector during and after the conflicts. In the Philippines, civil society sector has a strong democratic background since under the US colonies; Aceh where civil society has changed their roles after the peace agreement was signed; and the deep south of Thailand where civil society's role is linking between the state and local people. This chapter focuses on roles of civil society in the three case studies: Mindanao, Aceh and the Southernmost provinces of Thailand.

6.1 Roles of Civil Society in Mindanao

Peace is desired by everyone. But through the years, its urgency grew in the face of the alarming rise in deaths, properties damaged, and precious resources wasted in war efforts. Conscientizing and organizing people around these concerns ensure their participation in the process. Through networking, interventions are coordinated and enhanced. The constituencies building of Philippine peace NGOs are aimed at developing an enlightened and active constituency that will promote and build peace (Ferrer, 2013).

Civil society sector can play various roles in conflict situation. As mentioned earlier that civil society in the Philippines has strong influence in the country for a long history in many aspects such as democracy process, election, and conflict resolution. Roles of civil society in peacebuilding in Mindanao can be classified into eight types.

6.1.1 Security Protection

War weighs heavily on civilians, as many contemporary conflicts have shown. This is especially true for nonconventional warfare in which the enemy lines are not clear, and combatants could not easily be distinguished from the civilian population. The use of indiscriminate weapons and methods like air raids and landmines further make the cost on communities and human lives and well-being high (Ferrer, 2005).

Many organizations with peace were established after the post-Marcos. These included the peace zones such as the Sagada Demilitarized Zone¹ and the Cantomanyog Peace Zone². A peace zone was defined as a “geographical area within which war and

¹ It was founded in November 1988.

² It was founded in October 1989.

any other forms of armed hostility may no longer be waged, and where peace-building programs will address roots and manifestations of conflict in the community” (Ferrer, 1997). In terms of size, it may be as small as a neighborhood zone (purok³) or can cover the whole province. A peace zone was sustained through the efforts of its citizens using largely moral persuasion.

Security protection’s role can also be supported by advocacy’s role because this role is difficult for civil society to achieve by itself. Some traditional rites have been made occasions for peace-related activities to generate awareness of the goals of the ‘Peace Zone’. Stickers, posters, video documentaries, and sports activities became interesting vehicles for awareness-raising. Also a component of the fledgling peace movement is a campaign for a gunless society. It reaffirmed that Non-violence is a cornerstone of the social transformations which must take place if the world is to survive any material and spiritual sustainability, dignity, and beauty.

Respondent 3 agreed that “disarmament campaign is very important. It takes us quite some time to raise awareness in two issues which are small arm/guns and nuclear weapon”.

6.1.2 Wagging Peace

The wagging peace’s role was held in the Philippines Conference in December 2003 identified four strategies of the Philippines peace movement. This outline of strategies gives a sense of the range of peacebuilding activities that are being done and perceived necessary by the Philippines peace CSOs (Ferrer, 2005). Many of these elements reflect a continuity in terms of needs already identified earlier. The followings are four strategies of waging peace in the Philippines.

Strategy 1: Peace Process

The first strategy is to get the talks back on track. The process which includes citizens’ agenda for peace, participation on peace agreements, implementation and education, Independent monitoring mechanism and Community peace talks.

Strategy 2: Peace Constituency

The second strategy called ‘Peace Constituency’ which is to expand stakeholders for peace. This is to support community peace action and peace zones which involve

³ Purok is a political subdivision of a barangay.

other sectors, especially women and youth International support for peace in the Philippines.

Strategy 3: Peace Research and Policy

Peace Research and Policy Strategy includes National Peace Policy Alternative options: grassroots peace participation, effective ceasefire mechanisms, concrete options and referendum for Mindanao.

Strategy 4: Positive Peace

The final strategy is to accomplish positive peace which is beyond cessation of hostilities. Rehabilitation and reconstruction, Effective action on the roots of armed conflict are included.

6.1.3 Third Party

Civil society peace organizations can effectively act as ‘third party’ to the armed conflict-that is, an entity distinct from the direct conflicting parties (the state and the armed group), which are programmatically or ideologically antagonistic to each other. The third party’s relations with the state and the armed groups seeks to build a cooperative relationship with the first parties in order to jointly or collectively achieve the goal of lasting peace. Likewise, it aims to transform the relationship between the two first parties from individualistic or competitive to cooperative (Ferrer, 2005). Only by transforming relationship between and among themselves can a consensus on the peace agenda and a negotiated political settlement be achieved. An important attribute given to civil society groups is their autonomy from the state similarly. The third party is autonomous (in organizational structure, actions and goals) from the non-state armed groups.

The third party has its own peace agenda and strategies, element of which may or may not interface or coincide with that of one or both armed parties. When its positions on issue or policies are significantly different from one or both parties, it may choose to adopt a confrontational mode with referent to the specific policy issue. For example, when the Estrada and Arroyo administrations launched large-scale offensives in Moro Islamic Liberations Front (MILF) areas in 2000 and 2003, respectively, even as political negotiations were taking place, civil society peace groups condemned and campaigned against the policy (Ferrer, 2005). Peace groups have from time to time also

issued statements of concern criticizing certain rebel policies or acts that they deem contradictory or the goals of achieving peace or the success of the peace process.

While this autonomy renders it relatively impartial or neutral with reference to the first parties, the third party may have ‘insider-partial’ constituents or allies (Ferrer, 2005). Inside-partial constituents or allies are people or groups with close professional, personal, or other ties to the first parties to the conflict and are willing to support the work of civil-society peace organizations on a short-term or long-term basis.

6.1.4 Watchdog

It is noted the roles of Philippine civil society groups play in the democratization process-as watchdog or guardian, policy advocate, and service provider (Ferrer, 1997). Civil society peace groups acting as third party similarly play the important roles of watchdog of the state and the NSAs, advocates of alternatives and a sustained peace process, and provider of all forms of support services related to the process and its peace-building agenda (Ferrer, 2005).

Respondent 8 added their role in monitoring that “we give proposal assert their ideas and keep peace in general. If there is breakdown of the peace talks, we will urge conflict parties (i.e. the government and MNLF) get back to the talks”.

‘Bantay Ceasefire’ is an example of civil society actors providing direct support to peacemaking. The initiative has successfully established a niche in civilian monitoring and is able to mobilize constituencies for peace. There are risks to civil society actors playing this role - the most immediate danger is to the well-being of volunteer monitors. A few factors may have mitigated this risk: (1) the strong inter-linkages among civil society—locally, nationally and internationally; (2) the high degree of confidence that parties have in the initiative; and, (3) the violence began to wind down by the time Bantay Ceasefire activated. This implies that timing is essential—civil society may best engage in this type of activity when there is an opportunity to sustain and support conflict de-escalation. Another important factor is the perceived independence of Bantay Ceasefire and its allied CSOs (Iglesias, 2013).

Respondent 5 mentioned “there are also third party called ‘Bantay (=watch) ceasefire monitoring = we watch the ceasefire mechanism’. The peace

process mechanism has also a component called ‘ Civilian Protection Component (CPC) ’ . Community- based volunteer is monitoring any movements of both parties. This is to protect conflict happening and to reduce encountering. At the same time, they also play as a bridge-builder by being mediator between government and MNLF. It can be seen as an informal link. They monitor the progress of formal peace process. What they are doing is having meetings, updating with both parties in order to gain credibility. If MNLF have any problems, they will ask CSOs to tell the government. They also act as an observer in the formal peace process”.

6.1.5 Peace Advocacy

Advocacy is proactive process of continually and responsibly facilitate political movement for change, through a variety of methods and strategies, of changing policies which respect and protect their rights (Ferrer, 2005). Advocacy within the process of building peace must be based on the principles of peacebuilding: nonviolence, and without giving rise to or at least minimizing repercussions which strengthen the prime causes of violent acts and conflict, such as poverty, ignorance and dependence (Catholic Relief Service-Jakarta 2003). NGO advocacy for a just and lasting peace happens in various places and occasions such as on the streets, in conferences, in dialogue, in Congress, and at the pulpit.

Local and international conferences are held to develop and promote a peace agenda, to learn from past efforts and identify more ways to intervene in the process. The National Peace Conference (NPC) held in October 1990 is a landmark conference. The gathering convened representative from all sectors (urban poor, indigenous groups, business, the media, labor, etc.) and political blocs to draft a ‘ National Peace Version’ and a ‘ Peace Agenda’ (Ferrer, 2013). The NPC has consistently served as a mechanism for multisectoral consensus building. Other conferences seek to consolidate organizational directions along a more defined peace agenda. In November 1989, for instance, the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), in its general convention, resolved to work toward establishing a pluralistic political climate and to encourage the renewal of peace talks, among others (Ferrer, 2013). The NCCP is probably one of the biggest organization in the country that institutionalized peace building in its program orientation and organizational structure. It set up a Program Unit on Peace

tasked with defining and monitoring the NCCP's commitment to an ecumenical vision of peace.

Dialogues are held to allow for face-to-face encounters among group or people who do not normally interact. Among the earliest in this line of work is the Silsilah Dialogue series organized by the Zamboanga-based Silsilah Movement in 1984. The Sasilah hopes to build greater understanding and better relations between Muslims and Christians through interaction – from praying together with people of other faiths, to undertaking joint project for human development.

In 1989, the Xavier Peace Center⁴ in Cagayan de Oro hosted the 'Peace Dialogue on the Organic Act as a Nonviolent Alternative to Peace in Mindanao'. The Multisectoral and interreligious gathering of people from Marawi and Iligan assessed the mechanics for operationalizing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao as outlined in the draft Organic Act. They also drew up proposals for the peaceful attainment of autonomy.

In Cotabato, a major site of the Mindanao wars of the 1970s, the Center for Peace Education of the Notre Dame University initiated dialogue among various cultural/faith communities to promote intercultural respect and understanding in this ethnically diverse region. These dialogues led to the formation of a multisectoral group called the Sectoral Alliance for Cultural Solidarity. Member included representatives of the Christian and Muslim faiths, the lumad, and NGOs oriented to a peaceful and just development.

6.1.6 Peace Education

The Philippines are the only country among the three cases who realize the importance of young generation and peace education. Some Catholic schools are initiating awareness development programs on the values of peace and social responsibility. At least eight schools have declared themselves 'peace zones' (Ferrer, 2013). School activities have included ceremonial burial/burning of war toys, the creation of peace gardens, peacemaking trainings, setting up of a 'reconciliation tent' in school as an exercise in conflict management and resolution, public protests against violence in television, candlelight vigils for peace, and community-oriented dialogues with soldiers and police.

⁴ It is now called the Mindanao Development Studies Center.

The first university-based peace education unit is the Center for Peace Education of the Notre Dame University (NDU), Central Mindanao. The NDU composed of ten tertiary institutions and 112 schools from kindergarten to the secondary level. Organized in 1988, the NDU's Center for Peace Education offers a special program leading to an MA or PhD in Peace and Development Education (Ferrer, 2013). Within the University and the NDEA, the Center for Peace Education also acts as a coordinating agency promoting peace-oriented activities. The center's impact goes far beyond the university campus. A UNICEF-commissioned project involved training selected groups of public grade-school teachers and designing modules that would deal with the issues of children in situations of armed conflict (CSAC). The success of this ongoing project demonstrates the relevance of a peace education framework in conflict resolution.

Extension NDU classes for the military's engineering battalions have also been structured with a peace education framework. In addition, the center has formed a core team tasked with launching a series of trainings for peace education for public-school administrators and teachers throughout the Archdiocese of Cotabato. The center has also pioneered in peace education in the non-formal mode. Workshops for local government units, development NGOs, and church lay leaders have been conducted. The NCCP Peace Education program, on the other hand, caters to member churches. Materials for use in Sunday services, Bible-study reflection, seminar, and conferences have been developed. A peace education curriculum, designed for students aged fifteen and above, consists of deepening understanding of the biblical theological basis for the peacemaking ministry, studying the roots of conflict in Philippines situations.

Peace education is one of the strong roles for civil society in the Philippines as respondents agreed the importance of peace education during the interviews.

Respondent 2 said that "our main role is purely academic work which is setting Peace Education Course for the Mindanao University and elsewhere. This course's framework allows students to value their culture both Muslims and Christians and to appreciate the cultural diversity".

In 2016, the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies of the University for Peace and the Center for Peace Education of Miriam College organized a Forum on the theme 'Three Decades of Peace Education in the Philippines'. The Forum gathered more than 60 peace educators and advocates from all over the country representing various groups actively engaged in the peace movement in the Philippines (UPEACE News, 2016).

Participants came from state and private universities, colleges and schools, government, non-government and civil society organizations. The event provided an opportunity for sharing stories of hope and challenges of formal and/or non-formal or community educators in promoting peace education over the past three decades. It has been more than three decades that peace education in the Philippines has become a goal, a pedagogy, a program and a movement. Before the formal institutionalization of Peace Education in the Philippine education system, the movement for Peace Education in the country began in the early 1980s, with the efforts of several individuals and groups from civil society organizations, academic institutions, and international organizations engaged and mobilized to promote and mainstream education for peace. After the 1986 People Power Revolution, peace education took off through various efforts of individuals, universities, academic/ professional groups and civil society organizations, among others.

6.1.7 Peace Research and Training

The attainment of peace is a goal that requires continuing research and training of practical and analytical value. Database gathering, descriptive and comparative analyses of local and foreign experiences, and theorizing on peace and the way of peace—all these guide everyday action and contribute to the world body of knowledge and learning essential to world peace. On the other hand, trainings equip leaders, activists, and community residents with skills needed in conflict prevention, management, resolution, and transformation (Ferrer, 2013).

Several peace research and training institutes and programs have evolved to undertake these goals. The Research Center for Peace, Justice, and Democracy was put up in June 1990 at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines. The two others are based in the Mindanao State University (MSU) - Marawi, and the more recent, at the De La Salle University (DLSU) in Manila, called the DLSU Center for Peace Research and Development Studies (Ferrer, 2013). Others are institutes or programs outside the Universities and government, such as the Peace Studies Institute, Philippines (PSIPhil) established in 1990 by woman NGO writers and researchers. PSIPhil is building a database on Philippine conflicts and peace process and has also initiated a ‘Continuing Training on Conflict Analysis and Resolution’.

A pioneering training was cosponsored by the Tokyo-based United Nations University and the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS) in November 1991. The three week 'Regional Training on Domestic Conflict Resolution' drew participants from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Asian peace scholars gave the lectures. A talk with GO and NGO groups in the Cordillera and a visit to Sagada peace zone served as the practicum (Ferrer, 2013).

Another training was conducted by John Paul Lederach of the international Conciliation Service in August, on the invitation of the Mennonites Central Committee (MCC). The two-pronged training—one dealing with national-level political conflicts, the other on community-based conflicts—was hosted by a consortium of NGOs, including the MCC-Philippines, NCCP Peace Program, GZOPI, CfP, PSIPhil, LLAf, the CBCP's National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), the Education for Life Foundation, and the PRRM (Ferrer, 2013). The 'Peace Consortium' has since become an agency working on common research and training projects. A trainer's training focusing on interorganization conflicts was held in February 1994. The MCC's Lederach and Carolyn Schrock-Shenk facilitated the training attended by about forty NGO trainers from all over the country.

An encouraging development is the rise in the number of research projects involving women, a good number of which explores the concepts and role of women in the peace process. These projects were financed with grants from foreign development agencies, universities, and government agencies like the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) and the Office of the Peace Commissioner (OPC).

'Women for Peace: A Study on the impact of the Armed Conflict among the Women in Mindanao' done by the Research Institute for Mindanao Culture of the Xavier University, in 1992, was commissioned by NCRFW and the OPC. Other ongoing researches deal with the impact of militarization on women in the Visayas. This is being done by GABRIELA, a national women's organization. Meanwhile, PILIPINA will help identify the training and other needs of these women to strengthen their role in the peace process.

In addition, Respondent 3 said "We focuses on training of faculty members, educator teaching in the college of education. We think teachers are a very important actor because it is difficult to reach out all people so training teachers are the most possible way to get to the whole society. They are the people who are passionately committed to building a culture of peace. An

example of our project is ‘ Building Bridges of Understanding and Peace: Twinning Project between Muslim and Christian Youth’. This is to create new relationships between two groups that have been divided by historical and geographical circumstances”.

6.1.8 Service Delivery

In the ongoing violence, a number of civilians have been killed and injured; women have been widowed and children have become orphaned. The relief work role of the civil society sector seems very important in a country whose government often fails to respond to its people’s needs promptly. To provide help to the victims as soon as possible, many civil society groups have attempted to do this job by visiting injured people and distributing money to victims and their families. Civil society groups in the Philippines have taken on the task of providing relief and reconstruction work in affected communities (Ferrer, 2005). Such efforts include soliciting and distributing goods to displaced communities, providing counseling to deal with psychosocial trauma inflicted by the war, and assistance in resettlement and reconstruction efforts.

6.2 Roles of Civil Society in Aceh

Many respondents said role of civil society has been changed from human rights to anti-corruption, environment, economic, after the peace agreement signed. Later, BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi or Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias) was established by the government. Many CSOs changed to work at BRR and started to work with international groups like red-cross.

Respondent 17 said that “We lost a bit of human rights groups. Most of CSOs became developer, politician or economic CSOs. Before the peace agreement, CSOs roles mainly are advocacy about victims of the conflict, introducing self-determination to the people, acting as the middle sector raised an issue that people can choose what they want. Their objective for fighting was very clear which was the independence”.

6.2.1 Protection

The role of protection for civil society in Aceh during the conflict was not significant. The main group which represented Acehnese people was Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that did not focus on ending the conflict by peace method. However, the protection function was started becoming more efficient after the sign of MOU Helsinki in 2005 (Taqwadin, 2013: 55). It was Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), as one of the provision within MOU Helsinki, granted the 'protection' for those ex-GAM members that wanted surrendered themselves and gave up their weapons. However, as the institution that dealt with the early management conflict transformation and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, AMM also gave the 'protection' for those Indonesian military and security forces as well as civilian and monitored the following transitional period of post-conflict in Aceh. Although the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was consists of delegations from varied international actors, official and unofficial members. But, as essentially MOU itself was mediated and facilitated by CMI, that in fact as/or can be considered as global civil society actor since its scope of works cover entire international arena. However, some argue that MOU itself was not entirely mediated by CMI (as a global civil society) alone (track II), but also with the help of former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (track I), as Chairman of CMI and European Union, to reached the agreement between Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Government of Indonesia (Heiling, 2008 in Taqwadin, 2013).

6.2.2 Monitoring

The function of civil society in Aceh regarding the monitoring mission was already took a point since the 1990s. Aguswandi (2005 in Taqwadin, 2013: 56) argued that during the conflict, many Non-governmental organizations were formed to investigated and documented the human rights abuse since the beginning of the recent conflict, such as *CORDOVA* (an NGO educating the public on civil society and human rights), *Koalisi NGO-HAM* (a coalition of human rights NGOs in Aceh), and *Kontras Aceh* (The Commission for Involuntary Disappearances and Victims of Violence in Aceh). These local humanitarian-based NGOs, were worked with national-level human rights NGOs such as *Kontras* and *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* which followed by persistent international pressures led to the end of Military Operation Zone or known as DOM (*Daerah Operasi Militer*) for Aceh in 1998, also brought the opportunity for positive peace in Aceh at that time.

After the sign of MOU Helsinki, the ‘monitoring’ function of civil society was continued especially by Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as the institution responsible for monitored and handled the early warning system, human rights monitoring and DDR provision (Bhakti, 2008 in Taqwadin, 2013: 57). As the new established institution, it could not be denied AMM could not cover the entire Aceh perfectly. However, national and local civil society groups have been great helps for AMM to run their monitoring mission.

Respondent 22 said that “In general, role of civil society today became observer and monitor. If there is something wrong, they would report to the formal leader or government”. In addition, the role of civil society also has greatly increased the trustiness toward the accountability and transparency of the programs, so the society as whole could monitor the factual condition in Aceh during the peacebuilding period.

6.2.3 Advocacy

The function of ‘advocacy’ in Aceh was old enough being implemented along with the ‘monitoring’ function, it was efficiently being implemented after the end of DOM era. The advocacy activities done by civil society for Aceh peace process at national and international levels consists (Askandar, 2005 in Taqwadin, 2013: 58): lobbying and pressuring the Indonesian government and GAM to stop violence; capacity building and education, especially in promoting peace, including peace education and peace studies; research and data gathering, particularly about human rights and violence; and legal and non-legal advocacy for the victims of the conflict.

Respondent 21 said “Government always needs civil society to have their voice on their policy. It looks good for the government to have civil society criticized on their policies and outcomes. The government tries to make sure that civil society became the third voice between government and people. This is to make the policies balance and more influence”.

In Aceh, following the sign of MOU in 2005, was the real challenges for civil society. However, according to Darmi (2008 in Taqwadin, 2013: 58), civil society played significant roles in minimizing the potential for new conflict by promoting dialogue on sensitive issues such the potential division of Aceh into new territorial units. Furthermore, the civil society, such as mass media and news stations, also tried to portray the violence done by the spoilers of peace as criminal rather than recurrence of political violence

which should be dealt by law apparatus, to prevent the peace efforts being undermined. Both the post-conflict and post-tsunami programs in Aceh were mostly overlapped each other. In fact, wide range of civil society groups and individuals (local, national and international level NGOs) were also involved in supporting community economic empowerment. Also at the same time, these NGOs have been contributed in reintegration programs for ex-GAM combatants and strengthening the capacity of local civil society.

According to Respondent 19, there are the examples of civil society groups whose roles are relevant to advocacy. Truth Commission has three mandates and an activity like public discussion. They invited academic and civil society to discuss the following issues. First, truth seeking - to investigate, expose about human rights. Secondly, recommendation giving - to give an advice to victims on human right cases. Thirdly, reconciliation setting - to find a way to reconcile with combatants.

Respondent 18 told that “ our group was established on 22 June 2001 by an activist. I am the third generation. The purpose is to encourage democracy and good governance. Our main task is to advocate policies of Aceh and national governments. We produce infographic to make it easy for people to understand the government such as a conflict about fishermen⁵. Before the peace agreement, our group was funded by the Japanese government. We promoted peace journalism at the university. There was a campaign for young journalists. It was developed to be a module ‘how to write peace journalist’ at the university. We were funded by Germany during 2005- 2006. Then we are funded by Oxfam during 2006- 2009. We had a project ‘Clearing house policy advocacy”.

6.2.4 Socialization

In the context of Aceh, similar with monitoring functions and advocacy, the efforts of ‘socialization’ of peace or transforming to peace culture was already started since the end Military Operation Zone (DOM) in 1998 for Aceh. Since then, many civil society groups facilitated forum, seminars and discussions to promote non-violence and

⁵ After tsunami, fishermen were relocated to live in a mountain. This is not realistic for them to work by the beach.

peace to end the war. Civil society also contributed for change skeptical view of people toward peace efforts of mediated by merely international NGOs, such as Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) and Crisis Management Initiatives (CMI), which argued that have lack power in binding. After the sign of MOU Helsinki in 2005, civil society put a lot significant efforts in socialized peace and democracy through critical education, including increasing public awareness and trust in the contents of MOU, and in the political process such as, general elections and the drafting of Law of Governing Aceh (LoGA).

The involvement of civil society, particularly NGOs and intellectuals, in drafting LoGA might be considered as the biggest contribution of civil society in Aceh post-conflict. Since the decreasing issues of security matters and many possible conditions, civil society groups and individuals actively participated in various public forums, which trying to reach wide constituency and consensus to ensure the draft of LoGA would secure as many inputs as possible. Although, the final draft of the law weakened in aspect of division of power between central government and Aceh government. There is still general satisfaction for the article regarding the participation and transparency of local democratic process.

In addition, according Daud et.al (2002 in Taqwadin, 2013: 61), they argued that ‘socialization’ effort also being implemented by teachers and academicians in formal education institutions. It was believed that the peace and non-violence education must to be nurtured for the students/individuals since in the young age to establish the non-violence future generation.

6.2.5 Bridge Building

Although the responsibility of rebuilding social cohesion lying in the hand of government, however in conflict areas, as the government itself sometimes have struggle with conflict of competencies across levels of government or with lack of policy integration between different departments, the role of civil society is more able to handle the tasks rather than the government. Generally, this function might help bridging the communication between adversaries, revitalize groups interactions, interdependence and solidarity.

Respondent 21 added that “Civil society should be neutral and should act in the middle”. However, this function should aim to build a bridge between adversaries, rather than focusing on building and strengthening social capital.

Respondent 18 added that “ Civil society should play the role of social cohesion among government, private sector and CSOs ”.

One of the innovations of civil society in Aceh, particularly by community-based organizations (CBOs) and intellectuals, were the programs of capacity-building of informal leaders, such as village chief and subdistrict chief and strengthening of customary institutions such as village parliament (Taqwadin, 2013: 61). The informal leaders and its institution allow to diffused dissatisfaction at the local level also contributed for social cohesion in village and sub-district areas. This institution particularly has been significant in the process of reintegration of ex-combatants into society and act as first consular for any problems that come up within society before they are brought to formal law institutions.

Respondent 11 said “CSOs’ role in bridging is important because CSOs are very closed to the grassroots and people do not trust or believe the government. Some groups even have their own strategy to approach people. Therefore, CSOs help the government to make a better understanding to the people. They are mediator between the central government and the grassroots. They also play good role in promoting the local government”.

Moreover, Respondent 12 said about role of civil society that “ They act as a mediator between GAM and government and people. CSOs always support the peace process. CSOs always talk about referendum and democracy. CSOs that help internally displaced persons (IDPs), challenges are from military and GAM because both want to control IDPs. IDPs is very to GAM because it can be used as campaign”.

6.2.6 Intermediation

In the case of Aceh, civil society was the one who mediated conflict between state and non-state actors. Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) facilitated the first negotiation and Crisis Management Initiatives (CMI) in the second negotiation. The involvement of HDC at the first time of negotiation brought new alternative way to promote peace and tried to find better solution for Aceh. Although HDC only active in short period of time and failed to protect peace in the end, but their involvement brought new belief for peace in Aceh. HDC was able brought both conflicting parties into the same table regarding of cease-fire for humanitarian aid.

However, it was the new dimension for international NGOs in facilitated mediation between GAM and Government of Indonesia. Many people expressed their concerns about civil society capacity in facilitated the conflict, compare to the 'state-sponsored mediation' (Darmi, 2008 in Taqwadin, 2013: 63). Even though in fact, the backbone of HDC at that time included some important international actors such as Japanese government, European Union, World Bank and United States. Thanks to the efforts of HDC and their experience of failure in dealing with Aceh conflict, CMI was able to bring both conflicting parties into the same table again in 2005. It cannot be denied the factors such as; the Aceh tsunami in 2004, the involvement of Chairman of CMI, Martti Ahtisaari, the experiences dealing with Aceh conflict done by HDC, and wide range of pressures from every levels of society (local, national and international) was able to find better solution to end the conflict and for sustainable peace in the future.

Moreover, the function of intermediation of civil society in Aceh is not only limited on the state and non-state actors relationship, but also can be found in the grassroots levels of society. In the effort to rebuild social capital in Acehese society, civil society was succeeded to strengthened the capacity of local leaders such as village chief, subdistrict chief and village parliament (Darmi, 2008 in Taqwadin, 2013: 64). These efforts are genuine innovations brought by community-based organizations and intellectuals in Aceh. These local institutions have been greatly help for mediating the conflict within grassroots level of society in Aceh, which tend to directly solve the problems at first level before they bring to formal law apparatus.

6.2.7 Service Delivery

In the context of Aceh, service delivery can be considered as one of important function of civil society. During the first negotiations between GAM and Government of Indonesia, HDC brought humanitarian aid from outside as part of provision mentioned in the Humanitarian Pause on during June-December 2000 (although most of aids was sponsored by US, Norway, Japan and World Bank). Yet, the role of HDC was only lasted two years until 2002 in Aceh (Huber, 2004 in Taqwadin, 2013: 65). However, the service delivery function later on continued after the tsunami disaster struck Aceh on December 2004. This massive disaster brought nearly 500 civil society groups at all levels flooded in the province, 133 countries provided assistance to the humanitarian mission and 16,000 foreign military personnel from various countries were deployed, with the influx

of massive aid was seen as an opportunity to reach peaceful settlement of the insurgency and for all parties to work toward community development.

Respondent 11 mentioned the role of civil society sector has changed after the civil war ended “CSOs do not working for human rights anymore but today works are more on community’s empowerment, economic, small industries, small business in the village, start-up”.

As the end of conflict required the rehabilitation efforts for both conflicting parties and its victims, the function of service delivery in Aceh was continued to support the peacebuilding programs. Related to the condition of Aceh after devastated by tsunami, in fact many members of GAM and Indonesian military also became victims of this disaster. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, the post- conflict and post- tsunami programs were mostly related and overlapped each other.

Respondent 21 said “Healing society has not finished yet although the violent ended. Mental healing is also important. Domestic violent became more important as people got used to using violence during the civil war”. In addition, Respondent 10 said “CSOs can help with mental issue caused by losing their beloved ones from tsunami and civil war”.

6.3 Roles of Civil Society in Southernmost Thailand

The roles of civil society groups involved in peacebuilding can be classified into eight categories (Boonpunth, 2016: 377) including that of being security protector, representative, bridge- builder, relief worker, monitoring observer, academic, public communicator and peace- builder. The roles of civil society groups involved in attempting to build peace in the south can be analyzed based on the above categories.

6.3.1 Security Protector

In the deep south, state security agencies remain the key actors in protecting civilians from unrest incidents and violent attacks. Military and police forces are in charge as peacekeepers who have to deal directly with militant groups. The role of civil society groups as a security protector is hardly found in these provinces because they are not strong enough to protect themselves or to create a safe zone in their community.

However, some volunteer groups in the village, called ‘civil defense volunteers’ were initiated by the state for security reasons. As these groups were initiated by the

state, they have to be under the control of the Royal Thai Army. The government approved the Interior Ministry to recruit a number of civil defense volunteers to help maintain peace and security in the southernmost region (Boonpunth, 2016: 377). The total number of volunteers available is still insufficient, but the government has tried to boost their numbers by increasing their daily wage. Moreover, the safety of civil defense volunteers is an issue to be concerned about since they have been targeted by insurgent groups. These volunteers have been accepted well by the locals because they are selected from local communities. However, after the government has relied too much on military operations, the locals seem impassive or even wary of the expanding role of village militias.

6.3.2 Representative

The Malay ethnic groups in the southernmost provinces have a unique identity which is different from the majority of the country in terms of religion, culture and language. Moreover, these provinces are located in the deep south which is very far from the central government. This has created a physical and emotional distance between people in this region and the capital, Bangkok. This distance has made the locals in the south distrust government authorities and state officials. To pass on their matters to the central government, representatives who understand the local language and culture are needed. Lack of accurate data and news from insiders makes it difficult for the state security authorities to encounter the insurgent groups and handle the conflict. The role of civil society as a representative of the ethnic groups is necessary as local people hope that civil society groups can be their representatives who will report the facts and forward their needs to the government. Civil society network finally could build up confidence and power in order to push what they want to national policies such as policies about fairness, healing victims from insurgency and local decentralization (Tuansiri, 2013)

Civil society groups involved in the southern conflict have been classified into various categories which represent the specific needs of each group such as women, youth, academic and religious groups (Boonpunth, 2016: 377). Having data from these representatives is very useful when the government authorities want to get some opinion or information from the grassroots. This role of civil society is also to support a bottom-

up approach for information processing which is one of the most important factors to build peace in the conflict in the south.

6.3.3 Bridge-builder

As the gap between the government and local people in the southernmost provinces is very large, civil society groups can act as a bridge which will bring them closer to each other (Boonpunnth, 2016: 378). To solve this conflict, it is important to first understand each other because some of the root causes are differences in religion, culture, identity and ways of life. Trying to create a better understanding is the first step in showing sincerity to solve the problem. The state has found it difficult to identify who is involved in violent operations or is a member of an insurgent group as these groups operate in secrecy. People are usually scared to speak out because they are afraid of becoming a target of the state or militant groups. The significant role of civil society groups today is to create a safe space for people to communicate and negotiate among each other and with the state authorities. In this space local people can openly express their feelings, share their opinions and voice their expectations of the state. Tuansiri (2013) sees overall framework of civil society network was creating 'public space' between the state and civic movement under the components of civic infrastructure, civic virtue, civic enhancement and social capital gathering. Moreover, the public space widens social space which can share and discuss among between different cultures. Indirect way, the network could motivate each civil society group to cooperate and coordinate more with groups that are interested the same issues. Finally, it could strengthen trust and relations among civil society groups.

Thus, the civil society sector becomes a channel for people to gather and work for their community. State security authorities also agree on the importance of the role of civil society networks, especially as a mediator that has created a better understanding and strengthened trust among the conflicting parties.

6.3.4 Relief Worker

Although it is important as a way to provide urgent assistance to the victims, giving money away is not a sustainable solution. Some civil society groups have started projects which help the locals in the long-term such as giving them moral support, skills and funding for careers or accommodation. For example, the Deep South Relief and

Reconciliation Foundation (DSRR) initiated a project to construct houses for disabled victims of the violence through cooperation between the military and local administrative organizations. Besides building houses for victims, the project created an atmosphere of cooperation among civil society members, state officials and villagers (Boonpunth, 2016: 378). Moreover, these groups have created projects which aim to improve the economic situation in the conflict region. These include the goat bank project and the organic fertilizer project. Such projects aim to increase the potential of agricultural productivity, to motivate investors and to create jobs in this area. Many of these projects are based on the King's philosophy of a sufficiency economy and aim to increase income for the poor local people as well as to raise the quality of life of people in the deep south. Furthermore, it has been realized that money is not the only thing victims want, but encouragement and mind healing are also important for victims who have lost their loved ones. In 2020, civil society groups working with orphan and women are still very active but the today budget is more limited. This made them hard to develop their work on women. Thus, they tended to develop their work on social media.

However, relief work was seen as an opportunity for fake civil society groups to gain benefits for themselves because they are able to get funded quite easily and quickly. Thus, a civil society group with the role of relief worker needs more continuity and sincerity to prove they have a genuine purpose.

6.3.5 Monitoring Observer

The influx of assistance from various organizations into these southernmost provinces has created the problem of overlapping or missing data. Many civil society groups in the media and academic categories play a major role as monitoring observers. Their main task is to collect data which are relevant to the conflict. There have been some attempts to keep statistics and data on the deaths and casualties arising from the unrest. Some civil society groups, such as the Deep South Watch (DSW) and Deep South Coordination Center (DSCC), have developed the design of data presentation classified in various ways to make it more interesting and easier for users. The DSCC created a checklist program for victims' assistance which helps to identify if the victims have been assisted by these organizations or not. This ensures that all victims have been helped. Moreover, these civil society groups have monitored important issues concerning the conflict. The latest news about the conflict, such as violent incidents, government

policies or special regulations used in this region, are normally shared on their websites. This online database is very useful for people who live in the conflict area and outsiders who are interested.

Furthermore, the data from the civil society groups based on academics' knowledge is considered as particularly reliable as people in academic networks are highly respected by Thai society. The data from civil society groups (for instance, the DSW) have been used widely by researchers, media, and, especially, international organizations, because the data from non-government organizations is believed to be impartial and non-biased. They play an important role in communication and creating an understanding about the situation in the south to outsiders. It was said that (Boonpunth, 2016: 379) "With international organizations, we do not cooperate but we give them data. Embassies are the main groups which ask us for data. International organizations prefer using data from us because we have many kinds of data which are able to be balanced with the government side e.g. the rate of death and casualties. Even military and police ask data from us sometimes which we are glad to share because we are in the middle".

6.3.6 Academic

In the southern conflict, scholars and lecturers in universities in this region play a leading role in conveying knowledge about peace studies and doing research on conflict resolution. A number of universities in the south and other parts of the country opened schools or faculties for Peace Studies to help promote non-violent solutions. They have, however, been short-staffed and are looking for lecturers who have specialized in this specific field.

A number of researches and seminar series concerning the southern conflict have been produced by students and scholars from many universities and institutions on various topics some of which have offered alternative political solutions for the southern crisis. In the past, an autonomous solution was banned from being discussed publicly because it went against the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand: 'Thailand is one and indivisible Kingdom'. As a result of the growth in the civil society sector, this solution is now widely acceptable to be discussed publicly and some other new political alternatives have been suggested to the relevant state authorities. The idea of autonomy

and special forms of administration, however, has not been totally agreed to by the government and state security authorities.

Moreover, this academic role includes work that targets youth. The idea of the Sukaew Foundation is to bring Muslim and Buddhist youths together to pursue such activities as camping. They stated that “The general schooling system has separated the children from the two religions, so they do not have much chance to make friends and to learn about different cultures. When friendships have bonded, conflict is less likely to happen because they will live together with an understanding of social diversity” (Boonpunth, 2016: 379). This idea is very good because one of the root causes of the conflict is distrust and misunderstanding between cultures. These civil society groups have hosted some projects which will help the growth in the volunteering spirit in the next generations.

Peace Survey is another project started in 2016 in order to encourage people’s participation in the peace process in the southernmost provinces. It was led by a network of academic intuitions and civil society groups. A peace survey helps villagers understand the concept of a peace process and when the needs of the conflict parties and the local people meet, a peace poll can be implemented as an extra tool to assist in furthering the peace process.

6.3.7 Public Communicator

As it is generally believed that in conflicts who has control of the media will win the war, the role of public communicator is particularly important. Civil society groups in the media networks are very efficient in distributing news about the southern conflict. Today, there are various channels for civil society groups to communicate with the public such as websites, radio programs, social networks and hardcopy documents.

However, media civil society groups might have been used by the conflicting parties to report biased news or show only one side of the situation which would be advantageous to them. To gain more support from the local people, insurgent groups could use the media to inflame tensions between the locals and state officials. Some violent cases reported by media civil society groups have made people believe that crimes were committed by state officials.

Civil society groups such as the DSW have been widely trusted because they have been working in this area for a long time and their members come from various

professional fields such as academia and the media (Boonpunth, 2016: 380). Being watched by outsiders makes the government careful in implementing any hard-line measures or unjust policies which might affect human rights and create discrimination. This role of civil society will help in communicating and raising agendas concerning conflict resolution to the public through various types of media.

Besides news of the violence, these civil society groups should be able to reflect other positive issues such as the beautiful natural environment and unique local culture. Creating a better understanding about the real situation in the deep south is necessary in order to attract outsiders to travel to, and to invest in, these provinces again. This would help promote tourism and the local economy in the south as poverty is one of the causes of the conflict.

6.3.8 Peace-builder

The peace-builder role refers to civil society's direct involvement in the peace process. In some countries, civil society groups play a main role in initiating peace agreements; unfortunately, in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, the direct role of the civil society sector in creating peace in their community is hardly found. Even the official peace dialogues between the representatives of the Thai government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) insurgent group have just been highlighted in the news almost a decade after the upsurge of the violence.

Although the peace dialogue held in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia in February 2013 is not the first attempt to negotiate for peace, it is considered as the first ever official talks. Unfortunately, the idea of including the civil society sector in a formal peace negotiation process has never materialized in the history of the Thai state's dealing with insurgent groups. The civil society sector has always been denied access to any formal negotiations or peace dialogues which have normally been reserved for the state's actors only. During a series of these formal dialogues, the civil society sector can only observe and criticize this matter on their networks (Boonpunth, 2016: 380).

It is, however, a good sign that the peace process has been opened to the public as in the past Thai governments were not keen on negotiations and always held talks in secret. If civil society networks in Thailand become stronger, which requires more experience and time, they could be able to negotiate some matters concerning conflict resolution with the government in the future.

6.4 Comparison among Roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

Each case study called roles of civil society differently since they have different context and focus. The figure 6.1 concluded all civil society's roles called in each case study under the Paffenholz's framework. Although the three case studies of ethnic conflict have something in common, they are on different stage of peacebuilding process. The following are some of the most significant findings from the study.

The conflict in *Mindanao* is ongoing but it has gone through the stage of peace agreement between the government and the insurgent group. Also, the Philippines has a strong background on people participation and civil society work that was influenced by the US during the colonization. Therefore, civil society's roles in peace education together with peace research and training have been developed rapidly. This is a good sign for positive peace that need socialization process to change the perception of conflicting parties.

Aceh was one of the unique cases in Indonesia because the tsunami disaster was an accelerating factor. It was believed that the conflict came to an end, part of it, because of the tsunami. Therefore, civil society's role in service delivery is very strong as people were affected by the conflict and also the tsunami disaster. However, the new form of conflict began after the peace agreement was signed. The uniqueness of Aceh case is post-conflict situation. Acehnese do not fight for the freedom anymore. Economics disparity and conflict among local elites are more to be concerned.

Finally, the case of *Southernmost Thailand* that is way far from the peaceful end comparing to the other two cases. Thailand has not yet come close to a step of signing any peace agreement. Civil society in Thailand plays important role in 'bridge-building' that helps filling gap between local people and the government. Today, civil society tried to add more roles, especially in advocacy, to support and promote the 'Peace Talk' between the government and the representatives of Mara Patani and BRN. Time, patience and deep engagement are needed for civil society to work with local people in the deep south. Civil society should play a role in building trust among local people and the state.

Figure 6.1: The Roles of Civil Society of Paffenholz’s Framework and the Three Case Studies

Paffenholz’s Framework	Mindanao	Aceh	The Southernmost Thailand
Protection	- Security Protection	- Protection	- Security Protector
Monitoring	- Watchdog	- Monitoring	- Monitoring Observer
Advocacy	- Peace Advocacy - Wagging Peace	- Advocacy	- Public Communicator
Socialization	- Peace Education - Peace Research & Training	- Socialization	- Academic
Social Cohesion	- Peace Research & Training	- Bridge-building	- Bridge-builder
Facilitation	- Third Party	- Intermediation	- Representative - Peace-builder
Service Delivery	- Service delivery	- Service delivery	- Relief Worker

Source: Author

Protection

When a state weakened by armed conflict is often unable to protect its citizens, civil society is usually initiated during a conflict and its aftermath to protect citizens’ lives, rights and property against threats by conflict actors or the state. However, in the context of the three case studies, the role of civil society in ‘protection’ is not that proactive or effective. This function needs more actors to get involved, especially the state or strong actors (e.g. international organizations, powerful state leaders). Their useful tasks would be supporting for security-related issues such as demining, arms control and disarmament, demobilization, and creating peace zones.

Monitoring

The monitoring function can be effective if both protection and advocacy works together, also it is important for democratization to create accountability governments. In the case study of three areas, local and national civil society groups monitor the conflict situation and give recommendations to decision makers, or human rights and advocacy groups. Its main activities can be included such creation of early warning

system and human rights monitoring mission. However, the concern is how much the state rely on those recommendations proposed by civil society sector.

Advocacy

The advocacy role might be considered as core function of civil society in peacebuilding since its practically related in building communication to enhance the opportunities to run toward positive peace. The civil society groups in the Aceh and Mindanao have the significant role in lobbying and pressuring the government and conflicting parties through a variety of methods and strategies in national and international levels. For Southernmost Thailand, this role is not strong enough to facilitate political movement for change. Essentially, it would be more effective if the functions of advocacy, come along the same time as protection, and monitoring as there are closely related and influenced each other. The function of ‘advocacy’ in Aceh was implemented along with the ‘monitoring’ function, it was efficiently implemented.

Socialization

The socialization role is key point in transforming the violence-culture to peace-culture oriented. Civil society groups, especially in the Philippines, see the young generation as a key actor to keep lasting peace in the future, although this process will take a long time for the outcome to be seen. The socialization of peace is important for enhancing democratic attitudes and values. This function can be realized through the participation in association, networks or democratic movements. Peace education would be the expectation for this function of civil society which seems to be developed only in the Philippines.

Social Cohesion

Most cases of long-term conflict causes weakened and loss of social capital in the society, therefore enhancing social cohesion became essential tasks for stakeholders of peace. This function is very important for bringing conflicting parties and local people together. The role of ‘social cohesion’ can coordinate well with other roles like the role of ‘socialization’, for example, the functions of Peace Research and Training in Mindanao plays these two roles at the same time. Bridging between local people and the state is considered a significant role of civil society in southern Thailand.

Facilitation

Civil society sector can play a facilitating role in peacebuilding process normally involving conflict reduction efforts and conflict settlement efforts. One of important

function of civil society in peacebuilding is to take a role in mediation and facilitation. Civil society can take place not only between the state and citizens, but also between conflicted parties, as well as within groups on different levels of society. The influential mediator or facilitator is normally the formal international civil society organizations, for example, HDC and CMI in Aceh's case.

Service Delivery

Service delivery is considered as important function for most civil society organizations, particularly in weak states and during conflict. It might contribute in reducing violence actions between conflicted parties and creates pre-condition for civil society. Civil society groups in the three cases play this role effectively with a big help from international NGOs who help in funding. However, to make society get back to normal sustainably, this function should realize the importance of mind healing and job training as well.

In conclusion, although countries in ASEAN have the similar conflicts and violence contexts, ways to peace might be different depending on their contexts. Moreover, the link between the peace civil society sector and global peace movements or other national peace NGOs is weak. However, ASEAN Political-Security Community can learn from each country and play an important role as a center for peace education and research. This is to transform theoretical knowledge about peace to practice and to share best practices. ASEAN Political-Security Community has the power of share a concrete result for what has been done to really strengthen the CSOs' networks and the implementation of civil society sector as a peacebuilding tool. They can build up the feeling of affirmation that each country's work and engagement finds connection in the stories of others.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This final chapter will analyze the overall situation of the role of civil society in the three conflict cases: Mindanao, Aceh and the Southernmost provinces of Thailand. It consists of five topics including conclusion of role of civil society; key successes of civil society; challenges for civil society; recommendation for further study; and limitation of the study.

7.1 Summary

The insurgency and ethnic conflict are one of the most important problems in Southeast Asian region. The causes of the conflicts are multiple and complex which include legitimate issues such as relative and/or absolute deprivation; political, social, and/or cultural marginalization; landlessness; militarization; human rights violation; and resource exploitation. It cannot be denied that one actor who becomes successful in supporting the government/state actor achieve sustainable peace is 'civil society'. The rapid growth of CSOs may also be attributed to the government's policy to institutionalize civil society participation in national and regional development planning.

Civil society sector in the Philippines is widely seen as some of the most vibrant and advanced in the world. CSOs in the Philippines have been developed further than other countries in ASEAN because it was colonized by the US who implanted them democracy and political participation.

Conflict in Aceh was assumed as came to an end in 2005 with the effort of Acehnese people together with Tsunami disaster. Therefore, role of civil society was shifted from fighting for freedom to service delivering, victims relieving and healing.

The most significant role of civil society in southernmost Thailand is 'bridge builder' as a gap between local people and government are wide. For a better understanding between them, civil society play important role in filling those gaps. However, civil society sector in southern Thailand is still weak in passing their voice into formal policy making or peace dialogue process.

7.2 Key Success of Civil Society

7.2.1 Mindanao

- Network of civil society organizations makes civil society sector has stronger influence on government policy. For example, NGO networks formed the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) to promote professionalism, expand the reach of CSOs and increase their effectiveness.
- Peace education and research is important if we want to have positive or sustainable peace.
- Laws framework supports the growth of civil society sector, for example, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines clearly recognizes participation, empowerment and the important role of CSOs.
- Maintaining openness of the government to civil society is always important. The democratic space for CSOs has been expanded or constricted through the years depending on the state leader, the general political conditions, and the positioning of CSOs.
- Credibility of civil society in the Philippines is very necessary to gain trust from the public. It can be built by equally supporting both conflict parties (i.e. the government and insurgent groups).

7.2.2 Aceh

- The goal of GAM was very clear which was freedom. Objective must be clear and common objective should be one like in Aceh we only aimed for one goal 'Independent'.
- Civil society representatives attended in all steps of peacebuilding process.
- After signing the peace agreement, the relevant laws have been launched.
- Tsunami disaster helped the peace agreement settled faster. Then a huge amount of donation and funding was poured to Aceh.
- Many leading members of civil society sector were university students. It is important to have members from academic networks as civil society.

7.2.3 Southernmost Provinces of Thailand

- The significant advantage of civil society in the deep south is diversity. The network included various specialties such as women, youth, law, culture, education.
- Civil society council has created a common space that civil society and local people can share their opinions independently.
- People in civil society network in the south can cooperate to each other very well although they have different religions. For instant, the presidents of the civil society council of southernmost provinces of Thailand are Buddhist and Muslim, alternatively.

7.3 Challenges to Civil Society

7.3.1 Mindanao

- While political negotiation is a major peace-related rallying point, not all of these organizations necessarily prioritize political negotiations in their concerns.
- Policy of the state leader has high effect on civil society group's potential and ability to work on peace process.
- There are not only one insurgent groups involving in Mindanao. It is hard to deal with all insurgent groups.

7.3.2 Aceh

- The post-conflict in Aceh is an issue to be concerned. Ex-combatants and leading member of civil society have been facing some difficulties after the conflict ends. They created social jealousy as some ex-GAM members do not satisfy with the benefits they got comparing to the other former GAMs. Some ex-members turned to involve with illegal business. Those who got a better opportunity to work with the government tend to involve in corruption.
- Before peace agreement, CSOs worked together with one purpose which was peace. After peace agreement, CSOs work partially. CSOs compete each other to get funded. They are not allies anymore but competitors.
- Insecure of funding sources for civil society groups would be concerned.

- Lack of young generation who are interested to work in civil society network as they were born during peaceful society. They do not understand the situation during the war time. Civil society sector is running out of human resources
- Avoid involvement of international organization because it is difficult to control them. We have to make it clear that it is not jihad or international religious issue. Moreover, Sariah Law in Aceh. It is hard for outsiders to understand and follow.
- Sincerity of people who work in civil society is important.

7.3.3 Southernmost Provinces of Thailand

- Most civil society groups are established by old generation who have different views from younger generation. It should be figure out how both generations can work together.
- Civil society members have their own duties for example school teachers, so that how we can adapt their main duties in order to support goal of civil society and peacebuilding.
- Politics in Thailand is unstable and it always affected to the work of civil society because each government has different policy with civil society sector.
- Limit of budget became problem of civil society since the military government was in power in 2014 The government has been strict for applying international funding. Also, the government centralized all funding for the Deep South to ISOC. It is more difficult to get funding.
- Civil society groups should keep enough space between the government and civil society sector for example receiving funding from the government. civil society should set the framework of working with the state sector and security units.
- The network of civil society should get together or communicate face to face more than just meeting online.

7.4 Recommendations

7.4.1 Recommendations for Policy Making

- Government should be aware of the importance of the civil society sector that is advantageous in every stage of the peacebuilding process. The civil society sector plays different roles in each stage of the peacebuilding process. Government should plan to encourage civil society differently.
- Role of civil society in peace education is important for keeping sustainable peace. Getting participation from the young generation in the peacebuilding process is also required in order to strengthen the civil society sector.
- ASEAN members should share knowledge or lessons learned from conflict resolution by using the ASEAN Political-Security Community as a channel.

7.4.2 Recommendations for Further Study

- It should be further studied in comparison of roles and influences of other countries or international organizations to civil society roles in the peace process. It should be focused on how powerful countries open up opportunities for civil society which could affect 'Liberal Peace' or 'Illiberal Peace'.
- It should be further studied in other countries in different regions which have similar conflict and context such as South Asia and Africa.
- It should be studied deeper in specific types of civil society groups such as youth or women groups.

7.5 Limitation of the Study

7.5.1 Time limitation

- Some civil society groups were not available for interviewing during the fieldtrips. The researchers cooperated via phone and asked them to answer questions via email instead.

7.5.2 Safety limitation

- For the Mindanao case, some conflicts and violent situations are ongoing in the nearby region. Thus, the interviewed respondents were selected from peace civil society organizations located in Manila instead.

7.5.3 Budgeting limitation

- As research budget was cut off, the researchers decided to change the data collection in southernmost Thailand from in-depth interview to observation. However, the researchers still received useful data from the general meeting of Civil Society Council of Southernmost Provinces of Thailand. Also, the researchers have experiences in doing research and working with civil society in this area since 2011.

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